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1. Introduction 
» It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that 
have been tried. « (Quotations Page 2010) This is probably one of the most famous quotes 
by Sir Winston Churchill. Its meaning can be interpreted in different ways. Democracy 
could be, even if it seems not to be the “best type” of government, better than all other 
types of government human beings have tried so far. Another interpretation could be that 
all other types of government are so bad that they are simply worse than democracy 
without democracy necessarily being a “good type of government”. However the 
interpretation might be the key message is that democracy is a “better” type of government 
than the other forms which occurred so far. Still there is much criticism about democracy. 
Despite the critique against democracy it still seems to be worth to analyze this particular 
form of government because there was an upward trend for democracy a as a form of 
government within the last decades. The number of countries in the world classified as 
democracies has risen within the last decades especially with the end of the cold war – the 
rise of democracies with the end of the cold war is called the “The Third Wave of 
Democracies”. (Keman 2002, p. 42)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2010 differs between different governance 
types: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. It lists that 
in the year 2010 15.6 % of the 167 countries covered by the index were full democracies, 31.7 % 
were flawed democracies and the rest being hybrid (19.8 %) or authoritarian (32.9 %) regimes 
Figure 1: Global Trends in Governance 1800-2010 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2011 
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according to its own categorization – in total 47.3 % of the 167 countries covered by the index are 
regarded as democratic. (EIU 2010, p. 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Together with the increasing popularity of democracy as a form of government not only 
the question when or how democracies evolve occurs but also the question about the 
functioning of democracy.   
Analyzing the functioning of democracy is a complex task since many different factors 
could have an influence and democracies differ from each other – there are no two 
democratic regimes that are exactly alike. However by intuition it seems that some 
countries are more democratic than others and the goal of this thesis is to elaborate the 
factors which might have an influence on the functioning or the quality of democracy. The 
key question is: Which are the factors that influence the functioning of democracies? The 
term functioning in this context refers to the quality of democracies which will be 
explained below. The author of this thesis considers the “good functioning” of a 
democracy in terms of the quality of a democracy. A democracy that functions “better” 
than others is therefore regarded as one which has a higher democratic quality.  
It has to be stated that this undertaking is highly complex and probably cannot be analyzed 
completely. Certainly there is not a single or mono causal connection to explain why 
democracy does or seem to function better in some societies than in others. Some factors 
might not be measurable which makes a comparison of them highly difficult. There also 
might be factors which have an influence on the functioning or the quality of democracy 
which can not be identified due to complexity.  
The aim of this thesis is not to elaborate factors that support the occurrence of a 
democracy. The analysis and the comparison are related only to societies which already are 
democracies. 
Table 1: EIU Democracy Index 2010, by regime time 
Source: EIU 2010, p.1  
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2. Methodology 
This thesis tries to analyze the factors that influence the functioning or the quality of 
democracy by comparing two democracy indexes with measurable data of possible 
influence factors. For the analysis, the democracy indexes Democracy Ranking of the 
Quality of Democracy 2010 (Democracy Ranking 2010) and the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Democracy index 2010 (EIU 2010) will be used.1 Those two democracy indexes 
will be considered as indicators for the quality of democracy: The countries which have 
better ratings (or rankings) on those indexes will be considered as the democracies which 
function better and have a higher quality of democracy, compared to countries that do have 
worse ratings (rankings) on those indexes. Different variables will be compared and if 
possible their influences will be elaborated. While the goal is to find factors that influence 
the quality of democracy, indicators of those factors will be used for comparison, e.g. the 
income Gini coefficient is an indicator for the income distribution within a society, which 
is the factor. After comparing different sets of data and different relationships the author 
will try to make own conclusions and interpretations.  
During the analysis two approaches will be taken, as far as possible: (a) a comparison of 
the similarities of the “best functioning democracies” or the democracies with the highest 
quality; (b) a statistical comparison of all democracies with different variables.  
(a) As “best functioning democracies” countries will be regarded if they rank within the 
top 15 ranks of both mainly used democracy indexes (EIU 2010 and Democracy Ranking 
2010). Those countries will be named “High Quality Democracies” (HQDs) within this 
thesis. Those HQDs will be analyzed for similarities they have. This approach is taken to 
avoid a possible methodological bias.2  
During this analysis not all possible factors can be considered, the choice of the variables 
and indicators is based on a subjective approach of the author.  
Even if those two democracy indexes try to be comprehensive, they do not cover all 
countries in the world. The EIU Democracy Index 2010 (EIU 2010) for instance covers 
165 independent states and two territories and does not include “Micro States”. The 
Democracy Ranking 2010 ranks all countries which were categorized as “free” or “partly 
                                                            
1 The reason for the particular choice of those two democracy indexes is explained in chapter 4.  
2 This does not mean that other countries, which are not among the categorized HQDs, are not high quality 
democracies. 
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free” on the Freedom in the World Survey with a minimum population of 500.000 
inhabitants. Due to this method, countries like Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta are not 
included in the Democracy Ranking 2010 for instance, although they perform very well on 
the EIU 2010 and also on other indexes.3 The absence countries in one of the two used 
indexes has the consequence that those countries will not be included in the Group of the 
HQDs even if they have a top rating on the other index. The fact that those three countries 
are not included in the Democracy Ranking 2010 does not mean that they do not have high 
quality of democracy. They probably do and for that reason those three countries will be 
analyzed separately as well.   
The self chosen restrictive condition that the countries should rank among the top 15 of 
both democracy indexes does indeed lead to an exclusion of some countries from the 
analysis. On the other hand it is a measure to avoid biases or better said a “biased rating” 
of countries due to the possible “favoring methodology” of a single index.  
(b) A simple statistical analysis between the democracy indexes and the considered 
variables (possible influencing factors) will be done and the correlations will be computed 
with statistical software. The data is collected from different sources which will be 
specified. The related correlations and graphs are computed and created by the author of 
this thesis. All correlations are available in the appendix. 
Due to the absence of a universal definition of democracy and the different methodologies 
of democracy indexes only those countries will be used for the statistical analysis that are 
categorized as democratic in both of the mainly used democracy indexes. All countries on 
the Democracy Ranking 2010 (except a few exceptions with virtual values) are categorized 
as democratic in that index. The EIU Democracy Index 2010 has four categories: “full 
democracies”, “flawed democracies”, “hybrid regimes” and “authoritarian regimes”. Only 
countries among the first two categories (full democracy and flawed democracy) will be 
regarded as democracies in this index. Some countries are regarded as democratic in only 
one of both indexes: Turkey for instance is considered to be a democracy in the 
Democracy Ranking 2010 (rank 66) but is categorized as a hybrid regime in the EIU 
Democracy Index 2010 (rank 89). In this case Turkey will not be included in the statistical 
analysis because of the definition of hybrid regimes of the EIU Democracy Index. 
Consequently, other countries which are categorized as hybrid regimes will not be included 
                                                            
3 All three countries rank among the top 15 of the EIU Democracy Index 2010. Unfortunately not all other 
compared variables are available for those three countries.  
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in the statistical analysis. Also countries which are categorized democratic by the EIU 
Democracy Index 2010 but are not listed on the democracy ranking will not be used for the 
statistical analysis. Although the statistical analysis of the indexes and the variables will be 
done separately for each democracy index, only the countries which are regarded as 
democratic on both of the indexes will be used for the statistical analysis.4 The goal of this 
approach is to avoid biased results due to the methodology of the indexes. Applying this 
approach the sample size of the countries which are categorized as democracies by both 
indexes is 67. (EIU 2010; Democracy Ranking 2010) 
The comparisons will be followed by an interpretation of the results. It has to be stated, 
that even if certain relations or correlations between the democracy indexes and some 
variables are found, it does not imply the direction of the relationship nor the causality. 
This is a general problem if two variables are compared with each other. Elaborating the 
relationship usually requires a model or at least an assumption. The possible relationships 
will be tried to explain in a conceptual approach with the use of existing theory, if possible. 
The author of this thesis will proceed carefully in the attempt to find the relationships 
occurring from the data by being aware of the possibility of misinterpretations. The 
outcome therefore would not be definite relationships of certain factors influencing 
democracy and open to discussion.  
The indexes and the data will mainly cover the year 2009. This is due to the availability of 
the data for this year. Some indexes include the year 2008 or the year 2010. Unfortunately 
not all indicators are available for this period, e.g. the income Gini coefficient for the 
countries ranges between 2000 and 2010. The literacy rate values date between 2005 and 
2009 and some of the values are estimated. The indexes and the indicators have been 
chosen – as long it was possible - to cover the year 2009. 
There are different schemes for the interpretation of correlations. Generally speaking, a 
correlation indicates a linear relation between two variables, except in the case of 0. There 
can be positive (between 0 and 1) and negative correlations (between 0 and -1) – the higher 
the absolute value the higher the linear relationship. With regard to the interpretations of 
                                                            
4. For instance Albania and Lebanon will not be included in the statistical analysis with the Democracy 
Ranking 2010 ‐ although they are regarded as democracies by this index‐ because the EIU Democracy Index 
categorizes them as a hybrid regime. On contrary Guyana and Lesotho for instance are categorized as 
“flawed democracies” by the EIU Democracy Index 2010 but are not included in the Democracy Ranking 
2010 and consequently will not be used for the statistical analysis. Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta are, as 
already stated, also not included in the Democracy Ranking 2010 and therefore they are not included in the 
statistical analysis.  
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correlations in this thesis, the following categories (levels of correlations) will be used: a 
value of 0 shows that there is no correlation between two variables. A weak correlation 
exists if the value is between 0 and 0.5 whereas the author regards a medium  strong 
correlation for results between 0.5 and 0.8. A strong correlation is considered to be 
between 0.8 and 1, and 1 is considered to be a perfect correlation.  The “strength” of the 
correlation indicates the “strength” of the linear relation between both variables.5 
(Schlittgen 2003, p. 179)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 The translations was done by the author: keine Korrelation = no correlation, schwache Korrelation = weak 
correlation, mittlere Korrelation = medium strong correlation, starke Korrelation = strong correlation, 
perfekte Korrelation = perfect correlation 
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3. Political System 
Democracy is one type of different kinds of political systems. Even though each political 
system is probably unique in itself, there are main distinctions between them and according 
to them they are categorized. Political scientists usually distinguish between the following 
basic systems: authoritarian, democratic and totalitarian. Hybrid forms are also a 
possibility, meaning that they have elements of more than one system. 
a) Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes 
» Totalitarianism is tyranny with a rational bureaucracy, a monopoly of the modem 
technology of communication, and a monopoly of the modern technology of violence. « 
(Almond 1956, p. 403-404) Gabriel Almond argues that this type of political system has 
only become possible in modern times because its dependency on modern types of 
organization and modern technologies of violence and communication. (ibit, p. 403)  Juan 
Linz summarizes characteristics of a totalitarian system with regard of other authors as 
following: there is a monistic center of power; an exclusive and autonomous ideology with 
which the ruling leader or party identify and use as a basis for policies or for legitimizing 
them; the participation of the citizens in political and collective social tasks and their active 
mobilization are encouraged and rewarded. (Linz 2000, p. 70) There are also different 
definitions for authoritarian regimes. One of them comes from Juan Linz and the author 
considers authoritarian regimes as political systems with limited political pluralism, 
without a guiding ideology, without mobilization, and in which a leader exercises power 
within formally not clearly defined limits. (Linz 1970, p. 255) According to those 
definitions the distinctions could be done by the use of an ideology and mobilization.  
Other distinctions are possible as well. Paul Sondrol for instance makes a distinction of 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism by the characteristics of their leaders (dictators). 
According to him the role conception of the leader in a totalitarian system is the “leader as 
function” whereas in an authoritarian system it is the “leader as individual”. The ends of 
power for a totalitarian leader are public and in contrary they are private for the 
authoritarian leader. He also argues that totalitarianism has an official ideology whereas 
authoritarianism does not. (Sondrol 1991, p. 599-620) 
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b) Democracy 
The term democracy comes from the Greek word “dēmokratía” (“rule of the people”) 
which is coined from “demos” (people) and “Kratos” (power) and denoted the political 
systems of some city-states existing in ancient Greece, e.g. Athens. There is no universal 
accepted definition of the term “democracy”. According to Elgstrom and Hyden 
democracy is a system of government with the attributes that institutions and procedures 
exist through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies at 
national level, there are institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive, existence of inclusive suffrage and of the right of participation in the selection 
of leaders and policies. (Elgstrom and Hyden 2002) Larry Diamond uses the term 
"democracy" with a reference to Dahl's "polyarchy" or "liberal democracy": »This 
encompasses not only a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free, and 
fair elections and universal suffrage, but organizational and informational pluralism; 
extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and 
join organizations); effective power for elected officials; and functional autonomy for 
legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government.« (Diamond 1995, p. 11) 
Furthermore Larry Diamond and Leonordo Morlino regards the following as a minimum 
requirement of democracy: » 1) universal, adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, 
and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of 
information. « (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) Almond et al define democracy briefly 
as (…) » a political system in which citizens enjoy a number of basic civil and political 
rights, and in which their most important political leaders are elected in free and fair 
elections and accountable under a rule of law." (Almond et al. 2004, p. 27) The UN 
Democracy Fund (UNDEF) breaks democracy down into the following distinctive inter-
related components: constitutional design, electoral process, parliamentary process, justice 
and the rule of law, human right including freedom of expression, civil society 
participation, existence of political parties, access to information and transparency, 
accountable executive and public administration, and decentralized administration. 
(UNDEF 2010) In those definitions democracy is defined as a political system or a form of 
government.  
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Democracy sometimes is not only defined as a » (…) political system—a set of normative 
rules, and legal and political institutions, constituted in accord with those rules. It is an 
ideal, an aspiration, really, intimately connected to and dependent upon a picture of what it 
is to be human—of what it is a human should be to be fully human (whatever that might 
mean).« (Kompridis 2009, p. 31) The dual meaning of democracy, as a political system 
and as an ideal, makes classification necessary. Diamond and Morlino regard popular 
sovereignty, political and civil freedom, political equality, and broader standards of good 
governance as the main goals of an ideal democracy. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) 
This could be understood that democracy as a political system is one that tries 
(successfully) to implement the ideal – although the ideal might not be an end that can be 
finally achieved. It can be argued the closer a political system reaches the ideal the more 
democratic it is. In this thesis the focus lies on democracy in the meaning of the political 
system.  
Democracy itself can have different forms of its occurrence. As stated before each political 
system is unique somehow, if certain characteristics are regarded. The same applies for 
democracies. The most known forms of democracies are: direct democracy, representative 
democracy, liberal democracy, participatory democracy and consensus democracy – it can 
be argued that the complexity of the respectively democratic system and its decision 
making process increases from the first mentioned to the last. Although each democratic 
system is unique, there are some common similarities which they do share according to the 
regarded definitions. Considering the above used definitions of democracy a minimalist 
and a broader definition are possible. The minimalist definition would include free and 
competitive elections by universal suffrage, more than one party and alternative sources of 
information. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) A broader definition of democracy, 
considering the definitions above, would additionally include characteristics as freedom of 
expression and press, accountability, civil liberties, separation of powers, the rule of law, 
access to information and transparency, and political pluralism. 
Although democracies are seen as a form of majority ruling, minority rights are crucial as 
well – as Prohto and Grigg argue in their conclusion that majority rule and minority rights 
are the principles regarded as most essential to democracy. (Prothro and Grigg 1960, p. 
282) Certain “checks and balances” are needed for a democracy to function well – the 
simplest examples would be the separation of powers as well as a functioning political 
opposition – if the political opposition is repressed and has no rights or duties at all a 
10 
 
democratic system would not function properly since it would mean an absence of control 
over the government which is in power.   
Most of the countries in the world proclaim themselves to be democracies - for some of 
them (e.g. North Korea) it is obvious that they are not democracies. Apparently there is a 
difference between “de jure” democracies and “de facto” democracies. Only 4 countries in 
the world do not proclaim themselves to be democracies: Brunei, Burma, Saudi Arabia and 
Vatican City. (Nobel Media 2011) Relying only on this information the democracy map of 
the world would look as in the following graphic 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
██ Governments self identified as democratic ██ Governments not self identified as democratic 
Source: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Democracy 
Assuming the difference between “de jure” and “de facto” democracies a tool for 
measurement and distinction is necessary – surly an individual judgment is possible but 
would not be very precise. Democracy indexes are a possible tool not only for the 
distinction between “de jure” and “de facto” democracy but also as indication about the 
“quality of democracy”. 
c) Hybrid Regimes 
Hybrid regimes are seen as mixed systems which have attributes from both government 
types democracy and autocracy. (Pickel and Pickel 2006, p. 175) The term it self dates 
back to Terry Karl and was used by him for national states in Central America (except 
Costa Rica). (Karl 1995). According to Friedrich Rüb democratic hybrid regimes are 
characterized by free and fair elections and the rule of law but the separation of powers in 
hybrid regimes is low and more similar to authoritarian regimes and the comprehensive 
claim to power due to weakly distinct constitutional legality. (Rüb 2002, p. 109) Autocratic 
Figure 2: De jure Democracies  
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hybrid regimes on the opposite do not have the minimum of free and fair elections, 
participation is strongly restricted and competitive elections are restraint. The distinction 
between democratic and autocratic hybrid regimes is done by fair and free elections. 
(Pickel and Pickel 2006, p. 175) The EIU 2010 categorizes countries as hybrid regimes that 
have the following characteristics:  
» Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and 
fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious 
weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies--in political culture, 
functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread 
and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically there is harassment of and 
pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent. « (EIU 2010, p. 31) 
This categorization of hybrid regimes would at least not fulfill Diamond and Morlino’s minimum 
requirements of a democracy, as quoted above – in particular the requirement of free, fair and 
competitive elections would be violated. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) Furthermore the 
attributes of this definition are also not in accordance with other above quoted definitions 
of democracy. Therefore the countries categorized as hybrid regimes, e.g. Turkey, will not 
be included in the analysis due to the self chosen restriction that countries have to be 
categorized as democratic in both indexes (EIU 2010 and Democracy Ranking 2010).  
d) Level of Analysis 
Political systems usually refer to national states and this is the level for the analysis in this 
thesis. In general different entities could be subject to an analysis as well, e.g. the local 
level. States are usually considered to be the main actors in international relations and the 
“legitimate” executers of power. When trying to compare different political systems the 
main focus still lies on the level of the state. Not that states are the only actors but the 
aggregated level of a national state is taken for analysis and comparisons. Other 
possibilities would be to focus on the local level; the supranational or intergovernmental 
level (such as in the case of the EU); on an international level by analyzing the effects of 
elections, legitimacy and outcomes internationally; not yet practiced but in theory a global 
level could be considered if it would exist – some political scientists e.g. Alexander Wendt 
argue about the inevitability of a world government. (Wendt 2003)  
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This thesis will nevertheless focus on the state level.6 In this sense democracies will be 
analyzed and compared on a state level. In political science states are considered to be 
(legal) entities with the basic elements being: the state territory, the state power and the 
people of the state. States are seen to be sovereign with their “external sovereignty” to the 
outside world (e.g. other states) and with their “internal sovereignty” meaning the power 
over legitimate violence over a geographic location and population which is not subject to 
any other power or state. (Nohlen and Schultze 2010, p. 1016; Nohlen and Grotz 2011, 
583-585) 
In every political system, regardless if it is a democracy, the two key issues for analysis are 
power and interest and basic questions which can be asked are: How is the power 
distributed? Do the actors have legitimacy? In whose interest are actions taken and 
regulations implemented? To which extend are different interests represented?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 The term state is used in the meaning of sovereign state / a nation / a country. 
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4. Measuring of the quality of democracy and Democracy Indexes 
a) Measuring the quality of democracy 
Measuring democracies and their performance is a quite difficult project. Depending on the 
regarded variables the result can differ. Meanwhile there are different kinds of democracy 
indexes. They try to rank nations on a scale of “how democratic” they are. All of those 
indexes have their own forms of measuring and put different weights on different factors.  
Ratings about the quality of democracies should be regarded critically. Considering only 
one of those indexes could lead to biased conclusions, since the methodology behind them 
is different and could favor certain countries. Still, for the comparison of different 
countries and their ratings with other variables they seem to be useful. The outcome of 
such a comparison might deliver some useful information – especially when more than one 
index is used.  
Diamond and Morlino elaborate and refine the concept of the quality of democracy by 
creating a framework with eight dimensions on which democracies vary in quality: the rule 
of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, 
freedom, equality and responsiveness. Those dimensions could be used to measure the 
quality of democracy. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21-22) This list might not be 
complete and surely it can be extended. If those dimensions can be used to measure 
democracy, as the authors suggest, than the quality of democracy would be the “final 
outcome” of the degree of those dimensions. In this case the quality of democracy can be 
regarded as the depending factor on those dimensions which in turn can be seen as the 
independent variables. The authors differ between the (quality of) results, the (quality of) 
content and the (quality of) procedure. (ibid, p. 20-23) This approach seems to make sense 
since democracies for instance require a certain competition - at least two possible choices; 
this could be a competition of political parties – in order to provide a possibility to choose 
among different actors or ideas and to elect representatives. If only a single actor or a 
single group would permanently hold the positions of power and decision making this 
would certainly not result in a democracy, rather it would be an autocracy. Participation, as 
another example, seems to be a crucial factor as well, not only as a result for the quality of 
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a democracy, but also from the perspective of the contents and the procedure. (ibid, p. 22-
24) Again, if a single actor or a single group would decide or frame the content of the 
agenda, govern or take binding decisions the outcome would probably be one-sided and in 
favor of this actor – dictatorships are the best example for that. 
There is also much critique against democracy rankings and indexes. Beetham and Weir 
for instance argue that “comparative country rankings” cannot be generated because the 
aggregation of data is omitted by democracy audits. (Beetham and Weir 2000, p. 76) 
Diamond and Morlino state that » There is no objective way of deriving a single 
framework of democratic quality, right and true for all societies. « (Diamond and Morlino 
2004, p.22) The authors add that their multidimensional framework and the growing 
number of democracy assessments imply a pluralist notion of democracy quality. (ibid, p. 
22) One of the conclusions of Munck and Verkuilen in their analysis of different at that 
time available democracy indexes is – Democracy Ranking and EIU were not included in 
this analysis because they did not exist then – » (…) that constructors of democracy indices 
tend to be quite self-conscious about methodological issues but that even the best indices 
suffer from important weaknesses. « (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 5) Critiques against 
democracy indexes might be justified and true, however a comparison needs data. Both of 
the mainly used democracy indexes (Democracy Ranking 2010 and EIU 2010) do have a 
comprehensive assessment which is one reason of their choice.  
 
Although some democracy indexes have similarities in the analyzed factors or sometimes 
even in used methodology this does not mean that they are identical or do deliver the same 
results. Casper and Tufis show in their analysis by testing three different measures of 
democracy, that even if those measures correlate with each other they are not 
interchangeable because they can deliver different results if used in analysis with other 
variables.  (Casper and Tufis 2003, p. 2-9) This means that correlations between 
democracy indexes do not make them interchangeable. This section will explain briefly 
some of the present indexes of democracy which tend to focus on different dimensions as 
well as the reason for the choice of the two mainly used democracy indexes. 
 
b) The Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy 2010 
This democracy ranking is based on six individual dimensions: (a) politics 50%, (b) gender 
equality (socioeconomic and educational) 10%, (c) economy (economic system) 10%, (d) 
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knowledge (knowledge society and economy, education and research) 10%, (e) health 
(health status and health system) 10%, (f) environment (environmental sustainability) 10%. 
It only includes democracies, and as such only countries that are rated as “free” or at least 
“partly free” by the Freedom House Ranking (expect China and Russia). The country 
sample is also restricted to a population of at least one million and where a certain 
maximum number of indicators with missing values per dimension were not exceeded. The 
weight measures in this index follow the logic of Quality of Democracy = Quality of 
Politics + Quality of Society. According to the authors the conceptual formula for the 
quality of democracy can be summarized as: Freedom and other characteristics of the 
political system + performance of the non political dimensions. The country sample is 100 
countries. The periods of observation are the years 2008-2009. (Campbell 2008, p. 40-41; 
Campbell et al 2010, p. 3-7) 
c) The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2010 
This democracy index (EIU 2010) is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in the 
following five categories:  (1) Electoral process and pluralism; (2) civil liberties; (3) the 
functioning of government; (4) political participation; (5) and political culture. Each 
category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple 
average of the five category indexes. The country sample is 167. This index does not only 
cover democracies since it rates hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes as well. The 
years 2009 and 2010 are observed and the index reflects the situation in November 2010. 
An index only for the year 2009 was not prepared; the previous EIU Index of Democracy 
2008 covers the years 2007 and 2008. (EIU 2010, p. 31-32)  
d) Polity IV 2009 
This index is unique in that it examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic 
authority in governing institutions. It differs between autocracies, authority regimes 
(anocracies) and democracies. The polity scheme consist of six component measures, 
which record key qualities of executive recruitment, constrains on executive authority, 
political competition and changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. 
It includes only information on the institutions of the central government. (Center for 
Systemic Peace 2011)  » It does not include consideration of groups and territories that are 
actively removed from that authority (i.e., separatists or "fragments"; these are considered 
separate, though not independent, polities) or segments of the population that are not yet 
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effectively politicized in relation to central state politics. « (ibid) The index reflects the 
regime characteristics in effect on the end of the year 2009. (ibid) 
e) World Audit Democracy Ranking 2010 
The World Audit Democracy Ranking » (…) is concerned with the condition of democracy 
as it relates to 150 nation states – all those with a population of more than a million. « 
(World Audit 2011) Democracy is defined via the criteria of Human Rights; Political 
Rights; Free Speech; and the Absence of Corruption. This index uses statistics and reports 
from different sources such as Freedom House, Transparency International, Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International.  (ibid) 
f) Selection of the democracy indexes for the analysis 
The choice of the Democracy Ranking 2010 and the EIU 2010 was - besides the reasons of 
availability of their data and the relatively good reputation they have - in particular the 
ordinal score both indexes assign on each included country. This is particularly important 
for the statistical analysis and for computing correlations because using only a ranking is 
not possible for such an analysis. Besides that both indexes are comprehensive in their 
approach. The author of this thesis is aware of the fact that there is certain criticism with 
regard to the legitimacy of democracy indexes as well as the comparison of democracies 
with each other, as the above quoted authors argue. However, the indexes seem to be 
comprehensive and suitable for such an analysis – an own “rating” by the author of this 
thesis about the quality of democracy would definitely not be precise.  
Biases in methodology could always be possible: in this case most of the indexes or 
rankings are based in the so called “western world” and the cultural background of the 
researches might have had and influence in the analysis. However assuming that the 
indexes are unbiased they will be used for the analysis. The fact that both indexes correlate 
with each other – 0.895386 (own calculation) for the 67 of the observed democracies – 
does not make them interchangeable as some of the result will show. 
Polity IV focuses only on institutions and therefore it will not be sufficient for an analysis 
of the quality of democracy. The World Audit Democracy Ranking has no total ordinal 
scores assigned to each country but rather a ranking which makes it unusable for the 
statistical analysis. (Center for Systemic Peace 2011; World Audit 2011) 
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5. Economic factors 
» Therefore, in spite of the significant relationship discovered between the stability of 
democracy in economically developed countries and the higher probability that those having 
reached a certain level of economic and social development would be democracies, there is a 
sufficient number of deviant cases to warrant a separate analysis of types of political systems, 
social systems, and economic systems. There is no doubt that certain forms of political 
organization, of legitimation of power, are more likely in certain types of societies and under 
certain economic conditions than others and that some combinations are highly unlikely. « 
(Linz 2000, p. 57) 
 
The argument of this author is in favor for the causality that economical development 
favoring democracy as a regime. Linz still mentions deviant cases of a sufficient number. 
(ibid, p. 57) On contrary there are authors which think that capitalism is the necessary 
condition for democracy. (Berger 1992, p. 9)  Max Weber also assumed that a modern 
democracy can only occur in societies with capitalistic industrialism. (Weber 1906, p. 73) 
Schlesinger argues that democracy is the political product of technological development 
and capitalism. He also argues that inventions such as the steam engine and the printing 
press have been the fundament for a capitalistic development which in turn fostered 
rationality, individualism and democracy. (Schlesinger 1997, p. 5-7)  
The assumption that democracy follows or is a function of the socioeconomic development 
is part of the “theory of modernization” and some authors argue for this relationship.  
(Lipset 1994, p. 7; Bukes 2000 p. 12; Sunde 2006, p. 472) According to this theory the 
more developed an economy and society of a country is the higher is the likelihood of the 
occurrence of a permanent democracy. (Lauth 2010, p. 190) Several studies show that the 
level of economic development, usually measured as GDP per capita, is a central variable 
for the degree of the democratic development in a society.7 (Lauth 2010, p. 190) 
Schumpeter argued for modern democracy being a product of the capitalist process. 
(Schumpeter 1950, p. 297; Lipset 1994, p. 2)  Some authors argue that capitalism is a 
necessary condition for democracy but not a sufficient condition. (Lipset 1994, p. 2-3; 
Przeworski 2004, p. 487) Przeworski et al (2000) argue that modernization does not 
generate democracy but rather that democratic regimes above a certain socioeconomic 
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level of development consolidate and do not fall back to autocratic regimes. (Lauth 2010, 
p. 191)  
The quoted authors argue for either the relationship of economical development causing 
democracy or stabilizing or affecting the degree of the democratic development. There are 
also arguments for the opposite relationship between economical development and 
democracy. The authors of the EIU 2010 argue for instance that: 
»However, the direction of causality between democracy and income is also debatable. 
The standard modernisation hypothesis that economic development leads to, and/or is a 
necessary pre-condition for democracy, is no longer universally accepted. Instead, it has 
been argued that the primary direction of causation runs from democracy to income. « (EIU 
2010, p. 16)  
However the goal of this thesis is not to determine the factors that lead to democratization 
but rather the factors that influence the functioning on democracy and hence the factors 
that well functioning democracies have in common.  
5.1.  Economic Output and Income 
This section the relationship between economical developments as measured by GDP and 
GNI (PPP) per capita will be analyzed. Both variables are seen as (main) indicators of 
economic development. A country with high GDP or GNI (PPP) per capita is usually 
interpreted as high economically developed.  (Eurostat 2012; World Bank 2012b)  
a) GDP per capita (2011 US $) 
The GDP is still regarded as one of the most important economic key measures. The 
formula for calculating the GDP is: private consumption + gross investment + government 
spending + (exports − imports). It measures only the performance of an economy in respect 
to the output. This indicator can be seen as the sum of all produced or consumed goods in 
one period, generally one year, multiplied with their monetary end values. GDP per capita 
is simply the total GDP of one year divided by the population. (World Bank 2011c; World 
Bank 2011d; World Bank 2012b) This delivers information about the relation of the GDP 
in regard to the population – since countries with a bigger population tend to have a higher 
total GDP. Although the GDP is an important economical key figure and is broadly used, 
its information content is limited: It does not provide any information about the 
distribution of the wealth or of the income within a society. Still, the higher the GPD per 
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capita is the higher is the associated level of general wealth within a society. While the 
GDP per capita is only an absolute measure without considering the price differences and 
different conditions between countries, the GDP per capita in purchasing power parities 
(PPP) equalizes the purchasing power of different currencies. The GDP per capita in PPP 
delivers usually more relevant information for comparisons between countries. Sometimes 
the GDP per capita is still used for international comparisons. Since in the GNI per capita 
in PPP is analyzed as well, the analysis for the GDP per capita is done without considering 
the differences in purchasing power. This will allow analyzing the relationship of the 
quality of democracy with an absolute economical key measure rather than with a relative 
indicator.  
The World Bank defines the GDP per capita as:  
» (…) gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. « (World Bank 2011a)  
The data used is taken from the online database of the World Bank - the database includes 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files and it is based 
on 2011 U.S. dollars. Purchasing power parities (PPP) are not considered in this indicator 
and therefore it only indicates absolute values. (ibid)  
Plotting the GDP per capita and each of the two democracy indexes (EIU 2010 and 
Democracy Ranking 2010) on a scatter box results in the following two graphs. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: GDP p. C. 2009 / Democracy Ranking 2010 Figure 4: GDP p. C. 2009 / EIU 2010           
Own illustration Own illustration 
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In both graphs there a positive linear relationship is visible. In general the higher the GDP 
per capita is the higher is the achieved score on the respectively democracy index and vice 
versa. In deed the respectively correlations occur to be strong: The correlations for 67 
observations between the GDP per capita 2009 and the democracy indexes are: 0.875694 
with the Democracy Ranking 2010 and 0.860841 with the EIU 2010.8 These correlations 
within democracies and GDP per capita are strong – at least for the year 2009. The 
stronger correlation of the Democracy Ranking 2010 with GDP per capita could probably 
be explained by the inclusion of economic factors in the index.9 (Campbell 2010) The EIU 
2010 report states in contrary that the correlation of all countries in the index and GDP per 
capita in PPP is just under 0.6. (EIU 2010, p. 16) This lower value can result because of 
two possible factors: the adjustment of the GDP per capita with PPP lowers the 
relationship or the correlation with the GDP per capita is simply lower if the so called 
hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes are added.  
Looking at the data of the 12 HQDs and the 6 countries which were among the top 15 of 
only one of the both democracy indexes (HQDs Group B), it becomes clear that almost all 
of them have high GDP per capita rates. In fact all HQDs had a GDP per capita above 
30.000 USD (in 2011 currency) except New Zealand. Malta is the only country with a 
GDP per capita below 20.000 USD among the 6 additional regarded countries. Although 
all HQDs have a high GDP per capita rate, this indicator does not solely explain the 
differences in the quality of democracy since there are countries such as France, Italy, 
Japan and Spain with high GDP per capita rates which nevertheless do not make it on the 
top of the democracy indexes. (compare Table A 1 in Appendix) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 The correlations were calculated by the author of this thesis.    
9 The index uses economic indicators and weights them as the dimension “economy” with 10 % of the total 
score.  Among those indicators are GDP per capita PPP and GNI per capita PPP as well. (Campbell 2010) 
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Own illustration. Source: Worldbank 2011a  
 
 
 
b) GNI per capita, PPP (2011 international $) 
The gross national income (GNI) is a similar economical indicator as the GDP. The World 
Bank defines the GNI as:   
» GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income 
(compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.« (World Bank) PPP GNI 
is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power 
parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. 
dollar has in the United States. Data are in current international dollars. « (World Bank 
2011b)  
The GNI is calculated as GNI = private consumption + gross investment + government 
spending + net income from assets abroad + gross export of goods and services – gross 
import of goods and services – indirect business taxes. This economical indicator reflects 
the national income of a country over a certain period whereas the GDP reflects the 
production in country over a certain period. The GNI includes the income received from 
other countries and the income paid to other countries is subtracted. GNI per capita is the 
total GNI divided by the number of the inhabitants of one country. The conversion to 
international dollars (for the year 2011) using purchasing power parities makes this 
indicator a more relative one instead of an absolute indicator as the above used GDP per 
HQDs HQDs Group B 
Country GDP p. C. 2009 Country GDP p. C. 2009 
Australia 421302 Belgium 43640
Austria 45555 Iceland 37972
Canada 39599 Luxembourg 106252
Denmark 55933 Malta 19326
Finland 44576 United Kingdom 35163
Germany 40658 United States 45744
Ireland 49737 
Netherlands 48068 
New Zealand 29352 
Norway 78408 
Sweden 43406 
Switzerland 63524 
Table 2: GDP per capita 2009 (U.S. Dollars 2011) of HQDs 
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capita. An international dollar is equivalent by purchasing power over GNI to a U.S. dollar 
in the United States. (World Bank 2011b; World Bank 2011d) 
Plotting the GNI per capita PPP and each of the two democracy indexes on a scatter box, 
results in the two graphs below. (Figures 5 and 6) As previously with the GDP per capita 
with the GNI per capita PPP there is a positive linear relationship between with both 
democracy indexes. In general the higher the GNI per capita PPP is the higher is the 
achieved score on the respectively democracy index and vice versa. The respectively 
correlations are strong as well: The correlation between the EIU 2010 and GNI per capita 
PPP 2009 is 0.868112. The correlation between the Democracy Ranking 2010 and GNI per 
capita PPP 2009 is 0.906896.10 Again the correlation of the Democracy Ranking 2010 with 
this economical indicator is stronger than the correlation of the EIU 2010. This again 
probably results because of the economic factors are in the assessment of this index 
included. In both cases the correlations are a bit stronger than the correlations of the GDP 
per capita and both democracy indexes. This could be due to adjustment by PPP which 
make this indicator a more relative one. As in the case of the GDP per capita the same 
problem about the direction of causality applies here as well and the relationship is not 
clear.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 The correlations were computed with statistical software and are based on 67 observations.  
Own illustration 
Figure 5: GNI p. C. PPP / EIU 2010  Figure 6: GNI p. C. PPP / Democracy Ranking 2010
Own illustration 
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Also with this indicator it becomes clear that almost of the 12 HQDs and the 6 HQD Group 
B have a high GNI per capita PPP. All HQDs had a GNI per capita PPP above 30.000 in 
international Dollars (in 2011 currency) except New Zealand. Among the 6 additional 
regarded countries all have a higher GNI per capita PPP than 20.000 in international 
dollars.  
Again, although all HQDs have a high GNI per capita PPP, this indicator does also not 
solely explain the differences in the quality of democracy since there are countries such as 
with high GNI per capita PPP rates which nevertheless do not make it on the top of the 
democracy indexes, e.g. France, Spain, Italy and Japan. (compare Table A2 in Appendix)  
 
HQDs HQDs Group B 
Country GNI p. C. PPP 2009  Country GNI p. C. PPP 2009  
Australia 38380 Belgium 36610 
Austria 38400 Iceland 30000 
Canada 37280 Luxembourg 59590 
Denmark 38360 Malta 23160 
Finland 35910 United Kingdom 35640 
Germany 36830 United States 45640 
Ireland 32970
Netherlands 39690
New Zealand 28050
Norway 55390
Sweden 37830
Switzerland 47010
 
c) Conclusion 
Correlations do not explain the relationship of variables nor do they imply the direction of 
causalities. However the strong correlations and the fact that high values on those two 
economic indicators are a similarity all HQDs have makes coincident not likely and a 
strong relationship exists.  In this case the interpretation is difficult; either the economical 
output or income in democracies is positively influenced by the quality of democracy or 
the quality of democracy is positively influenced by GDP and GNI (PPP) per capita.  
Only the correlations between the democracy indexes and GDP and GNI (PPP) per capita 
for the year 2009 are not sufficient enough to assume causality in a certain direction. Three 
Own illustration. Source of Data: World Bank 2011b
Table 3: GNI per capita 2009 PPP (internat. Dollars 2011) of HQDs 
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different relationships are possible: (1) (the quality of) democracy influences the economic 
development (2) economical development influences (the quality of) democracy (3) the 
relationship is reciprocal. Arguments for the first two cases were provided by the above 
quoted authors. In the third case democratic development might have had an influence on 
economic development in previous periods, since high levels of economical development 
are usually achieved over time through accumulating economic growth. But in the 
regarded period of 2009 (a longer period could be possible as well) a high level of 
economic development could have had an influence on the quality of democracy. A 
possible argument could be as following: The higher the economical output or income of a 
society is the higher the “wealth” of this society will be and this increases the general 
possibilities of its citizens. This in turn would allow the citizens more participation in 
societal activities or politics. Since participation is regarded as a crucial factor for the 
quality of democracy a possible link between economic output or income and the quality of 
democracy could be draw. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 22-24) Dennis Müller also 
provides a possible argument for this relationship:   
» One advantage from higher incomes is that citizens may spend less time working and 
have more time to participate in the democratic process.  More importantly, however, 
economic prosperity provides resources to educate a country's citizenry, which in turn 
should improve the quality of the collective decisions they make in a democracy. « (Müller 
2009, p. 3)  
If a relationship from economic development to the quality of democracy does exist then 
by looking at the data it looks like, that the effects of the GNI per capita PPP would be 
slightly higher than the GDP per capita. A possible explanation for that would be that the 
(average) real income and the purchasing power of the citizens, as measured with the GNI 
per capita in PPP, is more relevant for their opportunities of the citizens than the 
economical output which is measured with the GDP.  
For a more profound analysis of the economical output on democracy probably a time 
series comparison would be necessary - in this case other variables must be taken in 
account as well. John F. Helliwell did a time series analysis for the years 1965 to 1985 but 
for the relationship between democracy and economic growth up to 125 countries using 
cross-sectional and pooled data over period from 1960 to 1985 and the two-way linkage 
25 
 
between democracy and economic growth was evaluated.11 As a result Helliwell finds 
robust and positive effects of income on having democratic forms of government whereas 
the estimated direct effect of democracy on subsequent economic growth is negative but 
insignificant (Helliwell 1992, p. 3-24):  
» Allowing for the possible positive indirect effect of democracy on income, flowing 
through the positive effect of democracy on education and investment, tends to offset the 
negative direct effect of democracy on economic growth. The general result of the growth 
analysis is that it is still not possible to identify any systematic net effects of democracy on 
subsequent economic growth. « (ibid, p. ii)  
The author further concludes about the relationship of income and democracy, that the 
notion of countries at higher income levels being more likely to have democratic forms of 
government and adds:  »This positive effect does not appear to be the result of reverse 
causation, as attempts to estimate the reverse effect from democracy to subsequent growth 
show that his feedback is more likely to be negative than positive. « (ibid, p. 21) The 
results of Helliwell indicate a relationship from economic growth on the occurrence of 
democracy. However the relationship between income and democracy found by Helliwell 
is in support for countries with higher income levels having the democracy as a form of 
government. (ibid, p. 21-24) The validity of the same relationship for the quality of 
democracy remains still not verified.   
About the (negative) relationship of growth rates and democracies Helliwell notes: 
» These results tie in with, and may provide some confirmation of the 
reasons for, the evidence that countries starting with lower levels of per capita 
income and productivity have rates of growth that are initially higher but then 
tend to slow down as the income levels converge. One possible component of 
this slowdown is that countries adopt democratic forms of government at some 
stage during their convergence, a form of government characterized by almost 
all of the richer countries. It is still unclear whether the adoption of a 
democratic government contributes to convergence by reducing the subsequent 
growth of the democratizing countries. « (ibid, p. 21)  
                                                            
11 For the measure of democracy Helliwell uses the annually published measures of political rights and civil 
rights published as described by R.D. Gastil (1990) in: “The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences 
and Suggestions” (Helliewll 1992)  
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In his conclusions the author additional argues that it is easy to understand that increasing 
levels of income and education likely will increase the demands of the citizens for many 
things, including the degree of political and civil freedoms which characterizes democratic 
systems. Helliwell also notes that there were relatively unstudied indirect linkages between 
democracy and economic growth flowing through education at the time of his research. 
(ibid, p. 21-24)  Although this argument is about the linkage of increasing education and 
income on the demand and occurrence of democracy it could possibly be applied to 
democratic systems as well. Especially the factor of education could be an important factor 
and will be elaborated in a separate chapter. (see Chapter 7.2.) 
Since GDP and GNI are very similar economic indicators, their possible influence on the 
quality of democracy would be similar as well. Still if one of those two indicators is to be 
preferred it probably should be the GNI per capita in PPP due to its measure of the average 
(real) income and due to the adjustment with purchasing power parities which expresses to 
a greater extend the “real economic” terms for the citizens than the GDP per capita – at 
least in terms of an average. Both indicators are just average values and therefore they do 
not deliver any information about the distribution. However an influence of economic 
output and income on the quality of democracy cannot be verified at this point.  
 
5.2. Income distribution  
The term equality can have multiple meanings and therefore refer to many concepts: 
Equality before the law, equal opportunities, gender equality, racial equality and social 
equality. Equity is another (normative) concept which is » (…) based on the idea of moral 
equality, the principle that people should be treated as equals. (…) This is not the same as 
treating people equally (…) rather, it is the idea that all count in the moral calculus « 
(Jones 2009, p. 3) The normative concept of equity will however not be elaborated in this 
chapter. Equality is also one of the dimensions of the quality of democracy of Diamond 
and Morlino. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) The authors state that democracy 
presupposes in practice a degree of political equality which is not possible if inequalities in 
wealth and status become too extreme. (ibid, p. 27)  There are also other authors and 
institutions that recognize the importance of economic equality for the democratic process: 
» Democracy prevails when either economic equality or capital mobility are high in a given 
country. On the one hand, economic equality promotes democracy. As the distribution of 
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assets and incomes becomes more balanced among individuals, the redistributive impact of 
democracy diminishes and the probability of a peaceful transition from an authoritarian 
regime to universal suffrage increases. « (Boix 2003, p. 3)  
 
Carles Boix claims that besides the level of income a country reaches, distribution also 
determines whether the country democratizes. (Müller 2009, p. 3) In his statement quoted 
above he identifies two prerequisites for democracy: economic equality or capital mobility. 
(Müller 2009, p. 3; Boix 2003, p. 3) The United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) points 
out the importance of equal opportunities:  
» To be sure, the other side of the democratic coin is politics, and politics is essentially 
about power and its distribution. Since the distribution of power and opportunity are to a 
significant extent economically determined, and vice versa, the overall state of human 
development in a country, as well as the distribution of resources and the equality of 
opportunities is an important factor in ensuring due democratic process. « (UNDEF 2010) 
Diamond and Morlino also point out, by referring to Dietrich Rueschemeyer’s observation, 
the effects of “inequality”: » (…) individuals and groups with better education, more 
information, and more resources will inevitably have more power to shape public debate 
and preferences and to determine the choice of leaders and policies. « (Diamond and 
Morlino 2004, p. 27) Considering the arguments of the quoted authors, economic equality 
seems to be an important factor in the democratic process. But what about the quality of 
democracy: Does economic (in-) equality influence the quality of democracy?  
Measuring economic equality is not a simple task: for a full measurement all transfers by 
the state, taxations and welfare policies must be regarded. One possibility however is to 
measure the distribution of income by the income Gini coefficient (Gini coefficient). This 
economic indicator does not measure economic equality fully but it indicates the income 
distribution of one society for a certain period.12 The Gini coefficient is defined as: » (…) a 
measure of income inequality that ranges between 0, indicating perfect equality, and 1, 
indicating complete inequality. « (UNDP 2003, p.39) The Gini coefficient is limited to its 
relative nature. Countries with identical Gini coefficient might differ considerably in 
wealth. Another limitation of this indicator is the use of nominal income instead of 
purchasing power. The advantages on the other hand are that it measures inequality by 
means of a ratio analysis which makes it easily interpretable, it is scale independent and it 
                                                            
12 It has to be stated that the income Gini coefficient just measures the income distribution but not the 
distribution of wealth. So the validity of this indicator is limited to income.  
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is population independent. (Ray 1998, p. 188-191) The highest observed Gini coefficients 
in the data of the UN were in Namibia with 74.30 (0.743) followed by Comoros 64.30 
(0.643) and Botswana with 61.00 (0.610) On contrary the lowest observed Gini 
coefficients were in Azerbaijan with 16.80 (0.168) followed by Denmark with 24.70 
(0.270) and Japan with 24.90 (0.249). (UN Statistics Division 2011)   
Due to its availability, its scale independence and its easy comparability the income Gini 
coefficient will be used for analysis: This section will analyze the relationship between 
income distribution and the quality of democracy. More precise the relationship between 
the Gini coefficient and the both used democracy indexes. According the arguments of the 
above quoted authors, and because equality is one of Diamond and Morlino’s dimension of 
the quality of democracy, the Gini coefficient will be considered as the independent 
variable. The relationship does not necessary need to be from income distribution to (the 
quality of) democracy because democratic governance on a high level could implement 
policies to increase the equality of income distribution, for instance through the influence 
of labor unions and by progressive tax policies or monetary transfers to the poor. However 
due to the reasons mentioned above the Gini coefficient will be considered as the 
independent variable in this analysis.  
The data for the Gini coefficient is taken from the UN Data online database. (UN Statistics 
Division 2011) Unfortunately the data is not available for a single year, in this case the 
year 2009. The data of the Gini coefficient from the UN database is valid for the years 
2000-2010 in which the data refers to the most recent year available. (ibid) Furthermore 
the database provides the values in a percentile scale between 0 (absolute equality) and 100 
(absolute inequality). (ibid) The results will not be as specific and significant in 
comparison to some of the other used variables, since the period of the observations for the 
Gini coefficient differs from each other as well from the year 2009 which is the analyzed 
year. The Gini coefficient does change over time but it seems that is usually does not 
change so quickly and preceding years seem to have similar value.13 (Eurofund 2009) The 
results of the analysis, even if not completely accurate because of the different periods, 
could in deed provide some information about the relationship to the quality of democracy.  
 Looking at the graphs of the Gini coefficient (2000-2010) with the respectively democracy 
index a relationship seems to exist but it is not a strong  
                                                            
13 At the table of Eurofund (2009) this can be at least observed for European countries.  
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There seems to a small tendency for countries which achieved high scores on the 
democracy indexes to have relatively low Gini coefficients and therefore a more equal 
distribution of income. 
A correlation analysis of the Gini coefficient and the two democracy indexes for 66 
observations has the following results: The EIU 2010 and the Gini coefficient (2000-2010) 
have a correlation of -0.446449. The correlation between the Democracy Ranking 2010 
and the Gini coefficient is a bit higher and has the value -0.525510.14 Those correlations 
are lower than initially expected by the author of this thesis. Even though there seems to be 
a negative relationship it cannot be considered to be strong. As in the case of GDP and 
GNI the correlation with the Democracy Ranking is stronger – however this cannot be 
explained by the economic factors this ranking includes in its assessment because income 
distribution is not included in the economic dimension. (Campbell 2010)  
The HQDs vary in terms of their Gini coefficient but are similar in that they all have Gini 
coefficients below 36 (0.36), except for New Zealand. The UN database does not list the 
values of the Gini coefficient for three out of the six countries in HQDs Group B (Iceland, 
Luxembourg and Malta). Among the three listed countries in the HQDs Group B UK has a 
                                                            
14 The Gini coefficient values are only available for 66 out of 67 observations. The value for Mauritius was 
not included in the data of the UN database.  
Figure 8: Democracy Ranking 2010 / Gini 
Coefficient 2000-
Figure 7: EIU 2010 / Gini Coefficient 2000-
Own illustration Own illustration 
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value of 36 (0.36) which would be similar to the HQDs although it is a bit high as the value 
of Australia and New Zealand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and USA) do 
all have a Gini coefficient above 33 (0.33) meaning in general they tend to have a slightly 
higher unequal income distribution than the other HQDS. The USA has the highest Gini 
coefficient of the HQDs including Group B with 40.8 (0.408) which indicates that it has 
the highest inequality in terms of income distribution. Although the HQDs have relatively 
low Gini coefficient values not all of them have the “best values” in terms of income 
equality (lowest values). Japan, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Croatia for instance have a 
more equal income distribution than some HQDs. (compare Table A3 in Appendix) 
Conclusion 
The data does not indicate a strong relationship between the income distribution and the 
quality of democracy. The computed correlations only indicate a weak or medium negative 
linear relationship. The only indication is that all HQDs including Group B, except USA, 
have a lower Gini coefficient than the global average (mean) of 40.79 (0.407) and the 
median of 39.80 (0.398) of all 145 listed countries. 15 
                                                            
15 The UN database 2011 (HDR) includes income Gini coefficient values for 145 countries. The average 
(mean) and the median are based on own calculations by the author of this thesis using the data of the UN 
Database. (UN Statistics Division 2011) 
HQDs HQDs Group B 
Country 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2000 - 2010 Country 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2000 - 2010 
Australia 35.2 Belgium 33 
Austria 29.1 Iceland N.A. 
Canada 32.6 Luxembourg N.A. 
Denmark 24.7 Malta N.A. 
Finland 26.9 United Kingdom 36 
Germany 28.3 United States 40.8 
Ireland 34.3
Netherlands 30.9
New Zealand 36.2
Norway 25.8
Sweden 25
Switzerland 33.7
Table 4: Income Gini coefficient 2000-2010 of HQDs
Own illustration. Source of Data: UN Statistics Division 2011
31 
 
A more equal income distribution does not necessary indicate a higher quality of 
democracy or vice versa. The question remains if there is a “threshold” of how unequal the 
income distribution in a democracy should for the country to achieve a high quality of 
democracy. Having an equal income distribution does not necessarily mean to have 
democracy: Azerbaijan (16.80), Belarus (28.80) Ethiopia (29.80), Bangladesh (31) and 
Egypt (32.10) for instance had relatively low Gini coefficients, even lower than some of 
the HQDs, but are not considered to be democracies by both indexes.16 (UN Statistics 
Division 2011) This also could indicate that democracies or a high quality of democracy do 
not necessarily increase the equality of income distribution in a society.  On the other hand 
the Gini coefficient does indicate the distribution within a society but it does not provide 
any information of respective income levels. All the above listed five countries with low 
Gini coefficients had low or very low GDP per capita levels in 2009. Also those countries 
had relatively low GNI per capita PPP values, except Belarus.17 (World Bank 2011a; 
World Bank 2011b) This could mean that if the distribution of income matters for (the 
quality of) democracy, it probably does after reaching certain income levels.  
 
5.3. Influence of Oil 
» If we also include a measure of oil wealth (…) the explanatory power of the regression 
increases sharply to some 60% of the inter-country variation in the democracy index. 
Although this still leaves almost 40% of the variation unexplained, it illustrates the often-
observed strong negative impact on democratic development of a reliance on oil wealth. « 
(EIU 2010, p. 16)  
According to the authors of the EIU 2010 the negative impact of a (reliance) on oil wealth 
on democratic development is often observed. The above described relationship, of which 
the explanatory power increases, is about the relationship of GDP per capita PPP and the 
EIU 2010 – a simple correlation between both variables for all observed countries in the 
EIU 2010 was 0.6 which, according to the authors, only explained one-third of the 
variations in democracy between countries by income levels. (ibid, p. 16) The relationship 
                                                            
16 Azerbaijan, Belarus and Egypt were not considered to be democracies in both indexes. Ethiopia was only 
considered to be a democracy on the Democracy Ranking 2010 but was on the last rank. Bangladesh was 
categorized as a Hybrid Regime by the EIU 2010 and was on rank 87 (out of 100) in the Democracy Ranking 
2010.  
17 The GNI per capita PPP values were due to the adjustment in purchasing power higher than the GDP per 
capita values. Belarus had GDP per capita of 5182 USD but a GNI per capita of 12530 internat. Dollars.   
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between oil and democracy however seems to be partly valid for the development of 
democracy and does probably not explain the quality of democracy. This section will 
therefore analyze the possible relationship between oil productions or between oil exports 
with the quality of democracy. The data for the oil production and oil exports is taken from 
the online database of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2011).18  
 
a) Oil production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graphs and regressions of both indexes and the total oil supply in 2009 do not indicate 
any relationship between oil production and democracy: The overall scores on the EIU 
2010 for countries with no oil production at all or with just a small production differ a lot. 
The computed correlations for 67 observations are 0.132099 with the Democracy Ranking 
2010 and 0.162578 with the EIU 2010 and also do not indicate any relationship.  
Looking at the data of the HQDs there also does not seem to be a relationship between the 
quality of democracy and the oil production nor any similarity. Canada and Norway have 
been the major oil production countries among the HQDs and this did not affect their 
democracies. 
                                                            
18 The reason this source was chosen is because the data it provides for the year 2009 which is open 
accessible. 
Figure 10: Total Oil Supply 2009 (1000 Barrels 
/ Day) / Democracy Ranking 2010 
Figure 9: Total Oil Supply 2009  (1000 Barrels / 
Day) / EIU 2010 / 
Own illustration Own illustration 
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Among the HQDs Group B the USA was the major oil producing country and in fact it was 
the country with the third highest oil production in 2009. A general relationship between 
oil production and democracy seems to be difficult to elaborate: Among the top 50 oil 
production countries in 2009, 22 countries are categorized as democracies in both indexes 
with 5 countries being among the HQDs: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany and 
Norway. (compare Table A5 in Appendix) On the other hand there are only six countries 
categorized as democracy among the top 20 oil producing countries and only four 
countries are among the top 10 oil producers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Oil Exports 
As previously the variables are plotted a two axis scatter box and the resulting graphs do 
not show a relationship between the export of crude oil and the quality of democracy. The 
regression line in both graphs has a flat upwards slope which actually would indicate a 
positive relationship but it doesn’t seem to be significant. The respectively computed 
correlations for 67 observations are insignificant: 0.172552 for the Democracy Ranking 
20100.261663 for the EIU 2010. In both cases there does not seem to be a relationship 
between the export of crude oil and the quality of democracy.  
   
 
 
 
HQDs HQDs Group B 
Country 
Oil 
Production Country 
Oil 
Production 
Australia 588.25 Belgium 11.22
Austria 25.41 Iceland 0
Canada 3294.42 Luxembourg 0
Denmark 262.14 Malta 0
Finland 8.72 UK (+ offshore) 1501.50
Germany 133.04 United States 9140.79
Ireland -0.43
Netherlands (+ offshore) 69.05
New Zealand 61.15
Norway 2350.18
Sweden 4.83
Switzerland 3.49
Table 5: Total Oil Production in 2009 (1000 Barrels per Day) of HQDs 
Own illustration. Source of Data: EIA 2011 
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HQDS 
 
Exports of Crude Oil 
including Lease 
Condensate 
(Thousand 
Barrels Per 
Day) 
 
HQD Group B 
 
Exports of Crude Oil 
including Lease 
Condensate 
(Thousand 
Barrels Per 
Day) 
Country Country 
Australia 250.04 Belgium 0 
Austria 0.00 Iceland 0 
Canada 1355.36 Luxembourg 0 
Denmark 171.14 Malta 0 
Finland 0.00 United Kingdom 788.92 
Germany 2.2 United States 43.795 
Ireland 0 
Netherlands 13.14 
 
New Zealand 45.18 
Norway 1758.88 
Sweden 0 
Switzerland 0 
 
The table of the crude oil export rates (in thousand barrels per day) of the HQDs does also 
not indicate a similarity – the only conclusion is that the majority (12 out of 18) of the 
HQDs (including HQDs group B) do not export any crude oil at all or only export small 
amounts. (EIA 2011)  
Figure 12: Exports of crude oil (1000 Barrels / 
Day) / Democracy Ranking 2010 
Figure 11: Exports of crude oil (1000 
Barrels / Day) / EIU 2010 
Table 6: Exports of crude Oil 2009 (1000 Barrels per Day) for HQDs 
Own illustration Own illustration 
Own illustration. Source of Data: EIA 2011 
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More interesting is the fact that the number of democracies within the top 50 oil exporters 
drops to 17 (22 countries were among the top 50 of the oil producing countries).19 Also 
there were only four HQDs and two HQDs from Group B among the top 50 of oil 
exporting countries.  Among the top 20 oil exporting there are only five countries 
categorized as democracies and among the top 10 this number even drops to a single 
country, which is Norway. (compare Table A5 in Appendix) 
 
c) Conclusion 
The conclusion of this analysis is that there is either no relationship between the total oil 
production or oil exports and the quality of democracy after a country has become 
democratic, or a relationship cannot be elaborated since most of the HQDs and most of the 
other democracies do neither produce nor export crude oil.  
A relationship in the occurrence of democracy and major oil production or oil exports 
(dependence on oil wealth) might exist – this probably depends on the time when the oil 
production started, before becoming democratic or afterwards. It looks like that major oil 
exporting countries are less likely to be democratic. This relationship of oil exports seems 
to be more significant compared to the production of oil and indicates a certain validity in 
the often observation mentioned in the EIU 2010 on the strong negative impact of reliance 
on oil wealth on democratic development. (EIU 2010, p. 16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
19 The categorization of democracy follows the same method: A country has to be categorized as 
democratic on both democracy indexes.  
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6. Factors of the State and the Political System 
 
6.1. State failure  
The state territory, the people of the state (citizens) and the state authority are considered to 
be the three basic elements by which a (national) state is traditionally defined. 20 (Nohlen 
and Grotz 2011, p. 584) The state authority consists of the monopoly over the legitimate 
violence within the territory of the state and of the sovereignty to the external world.21 
(ibid, p. 584; Nohlen and Schultze 2010, p. 1016) The monopoly over the legitimate 
violence is used by the state for the implementation and enforcement of its decisions.  The 
use of force of a state usually needs certain legitimacy which in modern democracies is 
both derived and limited by the “sovereignty of the people”.22 (Nohlen and Grotz 2011, p. 
584; Nohlen and Schultze 2010, p. 1016) The degree of the monopoly over the legitimate 
violence in practice differs among states. Some states do have a greater power over their 
territory and some states do not have the full monopoly on the legitimate use of force, for 
instance Somalia. Besides the ability to use force states do (should) also have certain tasks 
to fulfill, e.g. the protection of the citizens and their rights. (Nohlen and Grotz 2011, p. 
584) But not all states can fulfill those responsibilities.  
Possibly a relationship between the state’s control over the legitimate use of force, its 
fulfillment of certain tasks and democracy can be drawn – both factors could affect the 
democratic process in a state, the easiest example would be the connection between the 
monopoly over legitimate violence on the rule of law: If a state looses its ability to exercise 
the legitimate use of force than the implementation of the rule of law – since it needs 
executive power to do so – will suffer as well. Another example concerns the tasks of a 
state, for instance if a state cannot ensure the sufficient conditions for participation of its 
citizens.   
The above mentioned difficulties state can have in the control of the monopoly over 
violence or in fulfilling certain tasks is usually expressed as state failure. State failure is a 
term about the structural deficits in action and performance or capacity of a state. (ibid, p. 
598) According to Global Policy states are considered to be „Failed States“ when they can 
                                                            
20 Translated by the author: Staatsterritorium = state territory; Staatsvolk = people of the state; 
Staatsgewalt = state authority.  
21 Translated by the author: Gewaltmonopol = monopoly over the legitimate violence; Souverantiät nach 
außen = sovereignty to the external world.  
22 Translated by the author: Volkssouveranität = sovereignty of the people.   
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no longer perform basic functions such as security, governance or education usually 
because of extreme poverty or  fractious violence. In this power vacuum people can fall 
victim to crime and competing factions. State failure does not only occur because of 
internal factors. The destabilization of a state can knowingly be fueled by foreign 
governments. (Global Policy 2012)   
This section will analyze the relationship between “state failure” and the quality of 
democracy. For the analysis in respect to the state’s authority, its monopoly over the use of 
force and its capacities, for instance to provide public services, the Failed State Index 2010 
(FSI) will be used. The Failed State Index 2010 consists of twelve indicators to measure 
state vulnerability are: Demographic Pressures, Refugees / internally displaced persons, 
Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Economic Decline, 
Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, 
Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention. In addition the capabilities of 5 core state 
institutions are assessed, idiosyncratic factors and surprises are identified and the analyzed 
countries are ranked and placed on a map that shows their risk history. It includes 177 
countries. The organization Funds for Peace, which creates this index in collaboration with 
Foreign Policy, regards a failed state as one which is failing several attributes, such as: loss 
of physical control of its territory or monopoly on the legitimate use of force; erosion of 
legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public 
services. The Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) to 
generate the scores of the index. (The Fund for Peace 2011)  
The results are regarded as » (…) snapshots of state vulnerability or risk of violence for 
one time period each year. « (Foreign Policy 2011) The Failed State Index 2010 covers the 
period May until December 2009. The total score, on a scale 0-120, is the sum of the 12 
indicators. The higher the total score of a country the less stabile it is regarded – a country 
that has an aggregate score between 90 and 120 falls in the “alert zone” and is considered 
to have a critical status. According to Funds for Peace the CAST methodology has been 
peer-reviewed in several different fields including experts and independent scholars, 
government institutions, and private-sector agencies. (The Fund for Peace 2011)   
The two axis graphs of FSI 2010 with each democracy index indicate a strong linear 
negative relationship between state failure and the quality of democracy.  
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The computed correlations between the FSI 2010 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 for 
67 observations are -0.914622 and with the EIU 2010 it is -0.880704. These correlations 
are strong and verify a strong linear negative relationship between state failure and the 
quality of democracy.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HQDs  HQDs Group B 
Country 
Failed State 
Index 2010 
Score Country 
Failed State 
Index 2010 
Score 
Australia 27.30 Belgium 32.00 
Austria 27.20 Iceland  29.80 
Canada 27.90 Luxembourg 27.30 
Denmark 22.90 Malta 48.20 
Finland 19.30 United Kingdom 33.90 
Germany 35.40 United States 35.30 
Ireland 22.40
Netherlands 27.90
New Zealand 23.90
Norway 18.70
Sweden 20.90
Switzerland 21.80
Figure 13: Failed State Index 2010 / 
Democracy Ranking 2010 
Figure 14: Failed State Index 2010 / EIU 2010
Table 7: Failed State Index 2010 Scores of HQDs 
Own Illustration Own Illustration 
Own Illustration.  
Source of Data: The Fund for Peace 2011 
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A comparison of the HQD shows that all of them including the HQD Group B countries 
had relatively low values on the FSI 2010 and a ranked among the last (best) 20 – except 
Malta which ranks on 145 out of 177.   
Conclusion 
The relationship between “state failure” and the quality of democracy within democracies 
is strong, at least according to the indexes. States with high levels democratic quality have 
low low “levels” of “state failure” and vice versa. Some countries among the regarded 
democracies, which usually have lower scores on the democracy indexes, have high values 
in the Failed State Index 2010 indicating certain “state failure”. Sri Lanka (96), Colombia 
(88), Philippines (87), Moldova (84) and Indonesia (83) for instance achieved high scores 
on the Failed State Index 2010 and were labeled with the category “Warning”. (ibid) 
The direction of the relationship is still not exactly clear. Larry Diamond argues » Yet, not 
any country can become a democracy at any particular moment, and certainly not quickly. 
Failed states pose among the most difficult challenges for democratization. « (Diamond 
2006, p. 114) Diamond further argues that the democratization of non democratic regimes 
that remain (“tough cases”) is not simple because they lack, among other conditions - e.g. 
civil society, more developed levels of income per capita, democratic attitudes and values -  
the more basic conditions of a viable political order. Diamond regards a capable state 
(“having a state”) as precondition before a country can have a democratic regime: political 
institutions that exercise authority over the territory; maintaining order through an effective 
monopoly over the means of violence; extracting and distributing revenue; making and 
executing policies; producing public goods. (ibid, p. 93-94) However even if a relationship 
between state failure and democratization does exist, it is not necessarily valid for the 
quality of democracy. Another interesting and in this case relevant relationship exists 
between state failure and the rule of law. The FSI 2010 has negative correlations of -
0.849601 with the sum of the factors of the Rule of Law Index 2009 for 25 observations 
and  -0.886573 with the WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 (Score) for 67 observations. 
Considering the rule of law as a dimension of democratic quality, as Diamond and Morlino 
do, it is likely that the democratic quality would be negatively influenced by the attributes 
of state failure. This would especially be the case when a “decrease” in the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force occurs which in turn would affect the law enforcement ability of 
the state.  Delegitimization of the state could have a negative effect on vertical 
accountability; another dimension of democratic quality by Diamond and Morlino. 
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(Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21-23) A relationship from state failure on the quality of 
democracy seems likely but cannot be verified within this analysis. High levels of 
democracy might help or facilitate building a more stable state.23 Still, this would probably 
be likely to happen in the medium to long run. Considering a certain period e.g. one year, a 
sharp decline in state failure would probably lead to a decline in the democratic quality as 
well but not vice versa.  
Another interesting observation is that the FSI 2010 strongly correlates with GDP per 
capita 2009 and GNI per capita PPP 2009, even among democracies. The computed 
correlations for 67 observations are -0.852378 with GDP per capita 2009 and -0.884745 
with GNI per Capita PPP 2009 and thus they indicate a strong negative relationship. The 
lower the per capita income or economic output the higher are the the values on the FSI, 
indicating attributes of a state failure. The correlation with the income Gini coefficient 
(2000-2010) however, is 0.539990 and therefore only medium strong and not as significant 
as the other two economic indicators.24 A certain positive relationship seems to exist with a 
tendency that more income unequal societies have higher scores on the FSI 2010. Still this 
relationship is not strong and not significant. The Failed State Index has uneven 
development and economic decline among its 12 indicators. In this case the economic 
indicators could probably be considered the independent variables that have an influence 
on state failure. (Funds for Peace 2011; World Bank 2011a; World Bank 2011b) 
6.2. State fragility  
An international agreed definition of state fragility does not seem to exist. In a working 
paper of the International Department for Development the authors focus their definition of 
state fragility (fragile states) on the lack of political will to provide services and / or on 
weak capacity. States are considered to be fragile when their government is unable or 
unwilling to deliver the core functions to its people.  (Vallings and Moreno-Torrres 2005, 
p. 4) 
The state fragility index tries to measure how fragile a state is. 163 countries are assessed 
of which the total population is greater than 500.000. » The Fragility Matrix scores each 
country on both Effectiveness and Legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security, 
                                                            
23 The categorization of “stable” is taken by Funds for Peace ” for countries that have low values on the FSI 
as the opposite to “critical” for countries with the highest values. (The Fund for Peace 2011) 
24 The three correlations were computed by the author of this thesis using the data of the World Bank for 
2009 and the Failed State Index 2010. 
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Political, Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2009. « (Marshall and Cole 2009a, 
p. 7) The scores are then combined on eight indicators and rated from 0 (“no fragility”) to 
25 (“extreme fragility”).  
» A country’s fragility is closely associated with its state capacity to manage conflict; make 
and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in 
maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to 
challenges and crises, and continuing progressive development. « (ibid, p. 7)  
This index has some similarities with the Failed State Index but it differs in the used 
indicators and the meaning of the results. The State Fragility Index focuses on the 
capacities of the state: The two main analyzed dimensions are legitimacy and effectiveness 
– these two dimensions are rated in the above listed four dimensions.  (Marshall and Cole 
2009a, p. 7) 
This chapter will briefly analyze the relationship between state fragility and the quality of 
democracy. The scatter boxes the State Fragility Index 2009 (SFI 2009) and each of both 
democracy indexes show a negative linear relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The respectively correlations for the observed democracies (67 observations) indicate a 
negative linear relationship too: -0.704280 between EIU 2010 and SFI 2009; -0.808204 
between Democracy Ranking 2010 and SFI 2009. The correlation between the SFI 2009 
and the Democracy Ranking 20010 is considerably higher than with the EIU 2010. While 
Figure 15: State Fragility Index 2009 / EIU 
Figure 16: State Fragility Index 2009 / Democracy 
Ranking 2010 
Own illustration Own illustration 
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the correlation the EIU 2010 is medium strong the correlation with the Democracy 
Ranking 2010 can considered to be strong.  
Also all assessed HQDs and HQD Group B countries achieve the best scores ranging from 
0 to 2. (Marshall and Cole 2009a, p. 5-6) 
Economic indicators including the GDP per capita are considered within the assessment of 
the State Fragility Index.  An interesting observation is the relationship between the SFI 
2009 and two of the previously used economic indicators exists as well: The correlation 
between the SFI 2009 and GDP per capita 2009 for the 67 observations is -0.607557 and 
with GNI per capita PPP 2009 (67 observations) the correlation is -0.723339 and 
remarkably higher. The correlation between the income Gini coefficient and the SFI 2009 
(observations) is 0.429234 and therefore positive but not as strong as with the other two 
economic indicators.25 Those results indicate a certain relationship between state fragility 
and economical output or income. When all countries, not only democracies are analyzed, 
the relationship between in income and the SFI score is even higher: In the global report 
2009 the authors find a high correlation (adjusted R²) of -0.7596 between the State 
Fragility Index Score and GDP per capita of all analyzed countries for the year 2004. 
According to this result there is a negative relationship between income per capita and state 
fragility as well. It is also pointed out, that almost all net oil-producing countries have 
fragility scores far greater than would be expected for their level of income - compare 
figure 17. (Marshall and Cole 2009b, p. 14-15) 
The relationship between oil-production and state fragility seem to be higher if all 
countries are analyzed than the relationship between oil-production and the quality of 
democracy as previously analyzed only for democracies.  
 
Conclusion 
 A medium strong to strong relationship does exist between state fragility and the quality 
of democracy, at least according to the indexes. The direction of the relationship is not 
clear. The author of this thesis could not find a plausible explanation how the state fragility 
is related to or influencing the quality of democracy. The relationship seems more difficult 
than in it looked like in the beginning of the analysis. The definition and the methodology 
                                                            
25 All three correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.  
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used by the State Fragility Index make conclusions on the quality of democracy difficult. 
However, it is possible that state fragility affects the rule of law negatively which in turn 
could affect the quality of democracy. The relationship of state fragility and the rule of law 
is not definite because the latter is not included in the index.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3. Press Freedom 
This chapter will analyze the relationship between freedom of press and the quality of 
democracy. The Press Freedom Index (PFI) 2009 will be used as an indicator and its 
relationship to the democracy indexes will be examined for democracies. The PFI 
measured the violations of press freedom in 175 countries for the stated period. According 
to Reporters Without Borders the index tries to reflect » (…) the degree of freedom that 
journalists and news organisations enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the 
authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. « (Reporters Without Borders 
n.d.)  
This index is complied every year by Reporters Without Borders on basis of questionnaires 
which are completed by journalists and media experts around the world. The index for 
2009 reflects press freedom violations between September 2008 and August 2009.  (ibid)  
Source: Marshall and Cole 2009b, p. 14
Figure 17: Relationship between GDP per capita and State Fragility Index 2004 
45 
 
The index is bases on a questionnaire which assesses the state of press freedom in each 
country. Included are violations affecting journalists directly and news media as well as the 
degree of impunity enjoyed by people responsible for the press freedom violations. The 
level of self-censor ship in each country, the media’s ability to investigate and criticize, the 
legal framework for the media and the degree of independence of the public media are also 
measured. The final score includes assessed financial pressure as well. Abuses by armed 
militias and other pressure groups are taken into account too. The lower the score a country 
has on this index – with 0 being the lowest achievable score - the better is the situation of 
freedom of the press in this country. (ibid) 
Plotting the PFI 2009 on a scatter box with the respectively democracy index show a 
certain negative relationship between both variables. In general the better countries 
perform on the democracy indexes the better they seem to perform on the PFI (lower 
score) and vice versa though not all observations fit into this relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The correlations between the PFI 2009 and the democracy indexes for 67 observations are 
lower than the author of this thesis had expected: -0.584652 with the EIU 2010 and -
0.660552 with the Democracy Ranking 2010.26 The results, especially with the Democracy 
Ranking 2010, indicate a certain positive relationship between press freedom and the 
                                                            
26 The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.  
Figure 18: Press Freedom Index 2009 / EIU 2010 Figure 19: Press Freedom Index 2009 / 
Democracy Ranking 2010 
Own illustration Own illustration 
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quality of democracy since 0 is the best possible value to achieve in the PFI and the 
negative correlation is therefore to be interpreted in the opposite direction. 
A comparison of the HQDs shows that all the HQDs and HQDs Group B countries had a 
maximum score of 4,00 on the PFI 2009 with the Scandinavian countries and Ireland 
ranking on the top of this index with a score of 0. This means that press freedom 
(according to the PFI 2009) seem to be a similarity HQDs do have. Press freedom itself is 
still not a sufficient factor that leads to a high quality of democracy and the direction of the 
relationship between both is not exactly clear. Considering the dimension of freedom by 
Diamond and Morlino - which includes freedom of expression, thought and information – 
press freedom can be regarded within this dimension. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 26) 
This link and the use of press freedom in the assessment of both democracy indexes, 
allows considering press freedom as the independent variable. (EIU 2010, p. 40-42; 
Campbell 2010)  
The PFI 2009 ranking does not reflect the rankings of the democracy indexes. Countries as 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which do perform quite well on the PFI 2009 but do not 
make it among the top ranks on either of the two democracy indexes. 27 Other examples are 
Ghana, Mali and Trinidad & Tobago which perform pretty well on the PFI 2009 (within 
the top 30 ranks) but on contrary do not perform that well on the democracy indexes – 
Spain and France for instance were rated worse in 2009 than those three countries and do 
not make it within the top 40 of the PFI 2009. (Reporters Without Borders n.d.) 
 
Conclusion 
The relationship, as indicated by the correlations, between press freedom and the quality of 
democracy is weaker than initially expected by the author of this thesis. However, all 
HQDs share high degrees of press freedom. Considering the dimension of freedom of 
Diamond and Morlino, and the inclusion of press freedom in the assessments of the 
democracy indexes, press freedom can be considered the independent variable that 
influences the functioning or the quality of democracy.  
.   
                                                            
27All three Baltic States rank among the top 30 on the Democracy Ranking 2009. The EIU 2009 on the other 
hand categorizes all three Baltic States as “Flawed Democracies” with ranks between 33 and 48.  
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Own illustration. Source of Data: 
Reporters Without Borders n.d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4. Political rights and civil liberties 
The Freedom in the World survey by Freedom House (Freedom House Index) tries to 
evaluate the »state of global freedom as experienced by individuals. « (Freedom House 
n.d.) Freedom is defined as » (…) the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of 
fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination « 
and is measured in two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties.28 (ibid) 
The survey does not rate the performance of governments, but rather the right and 
freedoms enjoyed by individuals in reality. More emphasis is placed whether these rights 
are implemented in practice instead of the presence of legal rights. The Freedom in the 
World Survey 2010 contained reports on 194 countries and 14 related and disputed 
territories. The ratings reach from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (lowest degree of 
freedom) and the status designations of “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free” are assigned to 
each country. The observation period is between January and December 2009. (Freedom 
House n.d.) 
                                                            
28 » Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote 
freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and 
organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable 
to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. « (Freedom 
House 2011) 
 
HQDs 
 
HQDs Group B 
 
Country 
Press Freedom 
Index 2009 Score Country 
Press Freedom 
Index 2009 Score 
Australia 3.13 Belgium 2.5 
Austria 3.00 Iceland 2.0 
Canada 3.70 Luxembourg 4.0 
Denmark 0.00 Malta 2.50 
Finland 0.00 United Kingdom 4.00 
Germany 3.50 United States 4.00 
Ireland 0.00
Netherlands 1.00
New Zealand 3.00
Norway 0.00
Sweden 0.00
Switzerland 1.0
Table 8: Press Freedom Index 2009 Scores for HQDs 
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» The survey findings are reached after a multilayered process of analysis and evaluation 
by a team of regional experts and scholars. Although there is an element of subjectivity 
inherent in the survey findings, the ratings process emphasizes intellectual rigor and 
balanced and unbiased judgments. « (ibid) 
The relationship between the Freedom House Index and the democracy indexes can be 
ambiguous.  Although the purpose of the Freedom in the World Survey is to measure 
freedom Gastil for instance argues that it is “essentially a survey on democracy”. (Gastil 
1991, p. 22) The range of the measured factors however is not as broad as in both of the 
mainly used democracy indexes. However, this index will be considered in this thesis by 
its own stated purpose: as a measurement of political rights and civil liberties. Regarding 
the possible relationship between political rights and civil liberties, arguments of Diamond 
and Morlino could be helpful. The authors note that the different elements of democracy 
are interactive and overlapping and they continue: » Without extensive protection for and 
facilitation of civil and political right, many citizens will not have the ability to participate 
in the political process, both in the electoral arena and outside. « (Diamond and Morlino 
2004, p. 29) The two categories of the Freedom House Index are exactly the factors 
Diamond and Morlino, as quoted above, argue are necessary for participation. The authors 
further consider civil and political rights to be crucial to vigorous participation and 
competition of interests, organizations and parties which make for responsiveness and 
horizontal accountability. (ibid, p. 29)  
Considering the arguments of Diamond and Morlino the Freedom House Index can be 
regarded as the independent variable in this analysis. Democracy, after occurring, probably 
influences the rights and liberties of its citizens. But after becoming democratic, the degree 
of political rights and civil liberties can influence the dimension of participation within that 
society. The latter link is in this case more relevant to this analysis since the quality of 
existing democracies is analyzed.  
A simple correlation analysis between the Freedom in the World Survey and both 
democracy indexes for the 67 democracies result in the following correlations: -0.826980 
with the Democracy Ranking 2010 and -0.703242 with the EIU 2010.29 The relationship 
can be interpreted as medium strong to strong. Countries with a higher quality of 
democracy tend to have more political rights and civic liberties and vice versa. Since the 
lowest value of the Freedom House Index is 1, the relationship between rights and 
                                                            
29 The correlations are based on the authors own calculations.  
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freedoms and the quality of democracy is positive. The higher correlation with the 
Democracy Ranking is likely because of the inclusion of the Freedom in the World Survey 
in this index: The dimension “Politics” is weighted with a total of 50 % and within this 
dimension the indicators the aggregated scores for “political rights” and “civil liberties” of 
Freedom House are included with a weighting of 25 %.  (Campbell, 2010) This means that 
both indicators of the Freedom in the World Survey have a total effect of 12,5 % on the 
final score of the Democracy Ranking.  
All HQDs and countries in HQDs Group B achieve the best score on the Freedom House 
Index 2010 which is 1 and are categorized as “free”. On the contrary not all countries with 
this score are HQDs and in deed some of them are “medium ranks” of the democracy 
indexes: Chile, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.30 (Freedom House n.d.) 
Conclusion 
Between political rights, civil liberties and the quality of democracy – at least according to 
the indexes – there is a medium strong to strong positive linear relationship. Considering 
the arguments of Diamond and Morlino the Freedom House Index can be regarded as the 
independent variable within this analysis. This means that the degree of political rights and 
civil liberties, does to certain extend has influence on the functioning or the quality of 
democracy.   
 
 
6.5. The rule of law 
»WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED (…) to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be maintained, and (…) « (UN 1945, Preamble)  
» The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, 
and to that end: (..) and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; « (UN 1945, Article 1) 
                                                            
30 Some of the countries that score “1” on the Freedom in the World Survey were not rated by the 
democracy indexes due to their small population, e.g. Micronesia and Palau. 
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Referring to the above quoted parts of the Preamble and of Article 1, the concept of the 
rule of law is embedded in the Charter of the UN. (UNROL n.d.) But what exactly does 
rule of law mean? According to UNROL the modern concept of the rule of law involves: a 
system of governance based on non-arbitrary rules, an ideal of accountability, fairness in 
the protection and vindication of rights, prevention of punishment of wrongs and it is 
deeply linked to the principle of justice. (ibid)  The former UN Secretary-General states a 
more comprehensive definition of the Rule of Law:   
» For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. 
« (UN 2004)  
It is further continued that the rule of law requires equality before the law, measures to 
ensure the principles of supremacy of law, separation of powers, fairness in the application 
of the law, legal certainty, participation in decision-making and the avoidance of 
arbitrariness as well as procedural and legal transparency. (ibid)  
The Oxford Dictionary defines the rule of law as » the restriction of the arbitrary exercise 
of power by subordinating it to well-defined and established laws. « (Oxford University 
Press 2012) According to both definitions the rule of law includes the absence of 
arbitrariness in the exercise of power. The UNROL conceptualization goes further and 
includes (the ideal) of accountability and fairness regarding the protection and vindication 
of rights. Both definitions do not draw a link to democracy. The UNROL nevertheless 
states on their website that the » (…) core values of and principles of the UN include (…) 
the recognition that peace and security, development, human rights, the rule of law and 
democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.« (UNROL n.d.) Even if the rule of 
law and democracy are (among other factors) interlinked this does not draw a clear 
relationship.  
Diamond and Morlino regard the rule of law as one of the dimensions of the quality of 
democracy. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 21-23) O’Donnell regards the rule of law as one 
of the » (…) essential pillars upon which any high quality democracy rests. « (O’Donnell 
2004b, p. 32) Further the author argues that HQDs require » (…) a truly democratic rule of 
law that ensures political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in 
turn affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state 
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power. « (ibid, p. 32) For a state that enacts a democratic law O’Donnell lists three 
conditions: maintaining civil right, maintaining freedoms, political rights and guarantees of 
a democratic regime and a set of networks of responsibility and accountability. (ibid, p. 36) 
The same author draws the link between the rule of law and other dimensions of the quality 
of democracy with which the rule of law work intimately: safety of rights, equality and 
dignity, effective functioning of accountabilities, and responsiveness of the government. 
(ibid, p. 32) Diamond and Morlino regard the rule of law as a “procedural dimension” of 
the quality of democracy. (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 23)31 Further the authors argue 
that »The rule of law is the base upon which every other dimension of democratic quality 
rests. « (ibid, p.23) Additionally, they think that it is likely that with a weak rule of law 
participation of poor and marginalized groups will be suppressed, organization and support 
of many civic groups will not be possible, individual freedoms will be insecure, corruption 
and the abuse of power will spread, political competition will be unfair and overall 
democratic responsiveness will be seriously weakened. (ibid, p.23)    
Regarding the rule of law as a dimension of (quality of) democracy and all its possible 
implications enables to draw a link to democracy. The exact relation or exact causality 
would still not me absolutely clear: (1) the rule of law could be a necessary factor to obtain 
a high quality of democracy or reinforce it (2) a high quality of democracy could grant or 
reinforce the rule of law (3) or the relationship could be reciprocal. However considering 
the arguments of the above quoted authors that the rule of law is the essential pillar of any 
HQD and that it is the base for other dimensions of democratic quality, it is possible to 
argue for the first case. (O’Donnell 2004b, p. 32; Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 23) In 
this case the rule of law can will be considered the independent variable. 
In the following part of this chapter the relationship of the rule of law and the quality of 
democracy will be analyzed statistically and HQDs will be compared. An analysis requires 
again available data. Possible datasets on the rule of law are the aggregate indicator of 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project for the rule of law and the Rule of Law 
Index – both indicators are available for the year 2009.  
 
 
                                                            
31 The authors distinguish between three meanings of quality: procedure, content and results. (Diamond 
and Morlino, 2004, p. 21‐22) 
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a) WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 
The WGI indicator combines views of enterprises, citizens and expert surveys for every 
assessed country using data from different institutes, NGO, international organization and 
think thanks. (World Bank 2011e) The WGI rule of law indicator tries to capture 
perceptions of the degree of confidence which agents have in the rules of the society, 
property rights, the police and the courts, the quality of contract enforcement and the 
likelihood of crime and violence. (Kaufmann et al 2010, p. 4) This index has a dual rating: 
(1) Governance Score between (approx.) -2.5 and +2.5 with higher values meaning better 
performance (2) Percentile Rank from 0 to 100 with higher values corresponding to a 
better outcome in comparison to the other countries. This rating indicated the rank of the 
country and therefore has a relative character in comparison to all the other measured 
countries.32 (World Bank 2011e) 
Using the data of the WGI rule of law indicator together with the data of the respective 
democracy indexes and plotting them as scatter boxes including regression lines results in 
the following graphs: 
The graphs for both democracy indexes show a positive linear relationship: the higher the 
scores of the WGI the rule of law indicator are the higher are the scores on the democracy 
rankings and vice versa.  
The computed correlations for 67 observations of 0.899460 with the EIU 2010 and of 
0.895005 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 also show a strong positive linear 
relationship. Computing the correlations with the percentile ranks of the WGI rule of law 
indicator and the democracy indexes result in similar strong positive correlations: 0.874915 
with the EIU 2010 and 0.868720 with the Democracy Ranking 2010.33 The latter 
correlations show that the countries which perform well on the democracy indexes do not 
only perform well on the WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 in the scores they achieve but 
also that they do well in a comparison with other countries.  
 
 
                                                            
32 Usually percentile ranks of a score provide the percentage of the observations that lie below (or at) that 
score, e.g. a percentile rank of 85 means that 84 % of the scores of all the other observations are lower the 
score of the regarded observations.  
33 The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.  
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The comparison of the HDQs show that they all have Government Scores for the Rule of 
Law Indicator much above the average of all 67 compared democracies which is 0,5566.34   
 
Country 
WGI Rule of 
Law 2009 
Governance 
Score 
WGI Rule of 
Law 2009 
Percentile 
Rank Country 
WGI Rule of 
Law 2009 
Governance 
Score 
WGI Rule 
of Law 
2009 
Percentile 
Rank 
Australia 1.74 95.3 Belgium 1.38 88.6
Austria 1.78 96.2 Iceland 1.7 93.8
Canada 1.79 96.7 Luxembourg 1.81 97.6
Denmark 1.9 98.6 UK 1.73 94.3
Finland 1.96 100 USA 1.54 91.5
Germany 1.65 92.9
Ireland 1.73 94.8
Malta 1.51 91
Netherlands 1.8 97.2
New Zealand 1.92 99.1
Norway 1.9 98.1
Sweden 1.95 99.5
Switzerland 1.76 95.7
 
                                                            
34 The average of the 67 observations is based on own calculations. The lowest Government Score of the 
HQDs is 1.65 (Germany) and among the HQDs it is 1.38 (Belgium).  
Figure 20: WGI Rule of Law 2009 Governance Score / 
EIU 2010 
Figure 21: WGI Rule of Law 2009 Governance Score / 
Democracy Ranking 2010 
Table 9: WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 for HQDs 
Own illustration.  Own illustration.  
Own illustration. Source of Data: World Bank 2011e 
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The respective percentile ranks show that the HQDs and HQDs Group B rank among the 
top of all countries – besides Belgium (88.6) all achieve percentile ranks above 90 meaning 
that they have better scores than 90 % of all the other globally rated countries. The average 
percentile rank of all compared 67 democracies is 66.06.35  
 
b) The Rule of Law Index 2009 
The Rule of Law Index 2009 unfortunately rates only 35 countries in total among which 
only 25 of the analyzed democracies are rated. Besides that this ranking has not a single 
score but rather scores between 0 and 1 for 16 indicators are calculated – of which only 15 
are available in the report. (The World Justice Project 2012) A general statistical analysis 
for all democracies is therefore not possible. An option would be to analyze only the 25 
countries which are included in the Rule of Law Index 2009. For such an analysis the 
scores of the 15 different indicators would probably not much useful, except one wants to 
analyze the specific factors such as “Governmental and non-governmental checks”. A 
possibility is to sum up the scores from all factors to obtain a single total score and use this 
score for an analysis with the democracy indexes. 36  Countries which generally have high 
scores on the factors would have a high total score as well. A country with high scores on 
only one or two factors and low scores on the other factors would not have a high score in 
total. This analysis is neither comprehensive nor is it valid to find a relationship - it only 
can indicate a relationship due to the used methodology. Despite all limitations in this 
version of the Rule of Law Index, the author of this thesis regards this analysis as useful 
and valuable due to the methodology of this index.  
If only those 25 observations are considered than the graphs do indicate a positive linear 
relationship between the quality of democracy and the rule of law. The sum of all factors 
of the Rule of Law Index includes only the available 15 factors and not all 16. 
The respective computed correlations are strong: 0.872836 with the EIU 2010 and 
0.836200 with the Democracy Ranking 2010.  
                                                            
35 The average of the 67 observations is based on own calculations using the data of WGI (World Bank 
2011e). 
36 This is a suggestion by the author of this thesis. The authors of the Rule of Law Index do not proceed this 
way rather they compare the scores of all factors and sub‐factors in a regional level and on a basis of similar 
income levels.  
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A comparison of the HQDs cannot be done properly because the Rule of Law Index 2009 
includes only five of the HQDs (Australia, Austria, Canada, Netherlands, and Sweden) and 
only one HQD Group B (USA). But it can be stated that all of them perform well on the 
assessment of the Rule of Law Index 2009 if the aggregate scores are regarded in general. 
(ibid) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Conclusion 
The analysis with both of the rule of law indicators shows a strong positive relationship 
between the rule of law and the quality of democracy. Since both indicators are 
independent from each other the found results are significant. The correlations with the 
WGI rule of law indicator for all observed 67 democracies are stronger than with the Rule 
of Law Index 2009 for only 25 observations. In this case an increasing sample does show a 
stronger relationship which in turn shows the significance of the rule of law dimension. 
The arguments of the above quoted authors do indicate the causality from rule of law to the 
quality of democracy. The rule of law can therefore be regarded as a significant 
influencing factor in the functioning or the quality of democracy.  
 
 
Figure 23: Rule of Law Index 2009 (Sum of all Factors) / 
EIU 2010
Figure 22: Rule of Law Index 2009 (Sum of all Factors) 
/ Democracy Ranking 2010 
Own illustration Own illustration 
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6.6. System of Government: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism 
Among democracies a major classification of the system of government in two categories 
is possible and frequently done: parliamentary system (parliamentarism) and presidential 
system (presidentialism). Parliamentarism is understood as:   
» (…) a system of government in which the executive (the prime minister and cabinet: 
collectively, "the government") is chosen by and responsible to an elective body (the 
legislature), thus creating a single locus of sovereignty at the national level. « (Gerring et al 
2009, p. 337) 
Presidentialism on contrary is considered as a » (…) a system where policy-making power 
is divided between two separately elected bodies: the legislature and the president. « (ibid, 
p. 337) In this system the president is usually directly elected and is actively engaged in the 
policy making process and therefore plays a political role. (ibid, p. 337)  The CIA 
Factbook also included the selection of the government by the legislature (parliament) and 
in addition the dual responsibility of the government to the people and to the parliament. 
The definition of the CIA Factbook for the presidential system is similar as well and 
includes the separate existence of the executive branch from the legislature, to which the 
executive is generally not accountable. (CIA, n.d.)  
Gerring et al state that various admixtures between these two polar types exist and refer to 
a semi presidential system. (Gerring et al 2009, p. 337) The authors did an analysis to find 
out if “parliamentary systems are better” in comparison to presidential systems by 
analyzing a global data set with a historical measure of parliamentary rule and 14 
indicators. (ibid)37 They found a strong relationship the parliamentary system and good 
governance in particular in the policy areas human development and economic 
development. (ibid, p. 327) There conclusion drawn by the evidence in their analysis is that 
parliamentary systems have significant advantages over presidential systems to the extent 
in which the nature of the executive makes a differences. (ibid, p. 54) The specific causal 
mechanisms how the structure of the executive possibly influences various policy 
outcomes remain unexplored. However the authors list plausible possibilities: corporatist 
interest organization, centralized electoral accountability on the national level, stronger 
political parties, tighter principle-agent relationship within the bureaucracy, a more 
                                                            
37 For the “score of parliamentarism” the authors used an own conception generated by a three‐part coding 
scheme (0 = presidential, 1 = semi presidential, 2 = parliamentary) that was weighted with the sum of 
annual scores to include historical influences. (Gerring et al, p. 337‐338) 
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institutionalizes political sphere, decisive leadership, and the capacity for flexible policy.  
(ibid, p. 355) According to the authors, parliamentarism does in comparison to 
presidentialism often offer better tools for resolving conflicts between individual or group 
rationality and collective rationality. This is because parliamentarism integrates a diversity 
of views and provides greater incentives for actors to reach agreements. (ibid, p. 354) The 
causal reasoning of the authors is accompanied by the “ceteris paribus caveat”: » 
Parliamentarism should be more successful than presidentialism in coordinating diverse 
views and interests, all other things being equal. « (íbid, p. 355) As a conclusion the 
authors observe a higher quality of governance across many policy areas in parliamentary 
systems. (ibid, p. 355)  
Considering the relationship between parliamentary systems and the quality of governance 
as found by Gerring et al, this makes a relationship between parliamentary systems and the 
quality of democracy possible as well. A statistical analysis with all 67 democracies in the 
analyzed sample for the system of governance and the democracy indexes would not make 
much sense, since this section focuses only on the two types of governance, 
parliamentarism and presidentialism. 38 However, a comparison of the HQDs is possible 
which will be done in this chapter. The categorization of the respective systems 
(parliamentary or presidential) was done by using different sources that are listed in the 
box below. 
Comparing the systems of governance of the HQDs shows that all HQDs and HQD Group 
B countries (except USA) have a parliamentary system. Switzerland can be regarded as a 
unique case by its structure of a mixed form of parliamentary democracy, direct democracy 
and federalism. The system categorization of Switzerland in this dichotomous approach 
still would allow categorizing this country as a parliamentary system. 
Interestingly not only the HQDs and HQD Group B countries have parliamentary systems 
but also the majority of the countries which rank among the top 30 on one of the two 
democracy rankings have parliamentary systems: Among the top 30 of the Democracy 
Ranking 2010 only Chile, Costa Rica, France (semi-presidential), Uruguay, and USA have 
presidential systems. On the EIU 2010 only Costa Rica, South Africa, South Korea, 
                                                            
38 A possible approach for a statistical analysis would be the one which Gerring et al did take by using a 
three‐part coding scheme. (Gerring et al, p. 337) 
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Uruguay, and USA made it among the top 30 as presidential systems.39 (Democracy 
Ranking 2011; EIU 2010) This means that in total only seven countries are among the top 
30 of one of the two democracy indexes. 
Conclusion 
In this analysis the system of governance is the independent variable since the choice of 
the system is not affected by the quality of democracy.  
The system of governance seems to have an influence on the quality of democracy. At least 
this is indicated by a short analysis in respect to the two democracy indexes. The effects 
might be similar as observed by Gerring et al, particularly in “good governance”. (Gerring 
et al 2009, p. 327) The reason for that could be the same as Gerring et al state that is the 
tendency of parliamentarism to offer better conflict solving tools between individual and 
collective rationality and its integration of a diversity of views and its greater incentives for 
actors to reach agreements. (ibid, p. 354) 
The effects of parliamentarism (dramatic changes) on the quality of governance or the 
quality on democracy should not be expected immediately after the switch to or the 
establishment of a parliamentary system as Gerring et al suggest. The effects are likely to 
cumulate over time due to the affect on actions and expectations by the new institutional 
rules. (ibid, p. 337-338) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
39 For the categorizations of the type of government is based on the data from EIU 2012, CIA Factbook n.d., 
Fischer Verlag 2012 and The Economist 2012.   
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7. Social factors 
7.1. Corruption 
The term corrupt comes from the Latin word “corruptus” with the meaning “to abuse or 
destroy”. The term can be used in different contexts and varies in its meaning.  Political 
corruption for instance usually involves the misuse of political office for either material or 
political advantage. Narrowly applied it means the violation of specific laws, usually for a  
payment and loosely defined it means the deviation from an expected pattern of behavior 
or an ideal. A certain degree of political corruption is regarded by some authors as 
inevitable. Bribery is considered as a main tool of corruption and bribes » (…) can be used 
by private parties to "buy" many things provided by central or local governments, or 
officials may seek bribes in supplying those things. « (World Bank 2012a) 
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) defines corruption as:  
» (…) a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that affects all countries. 
Corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and 
contributes to governmental instability. Corruption attacks the foundation of democratic 
institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law and creating 
bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing is the soliciting of bribes. Economic 
development is stunted because foreign direct investment is discouraged and small 
businesses within the country often find it impossible to overcome the "start-up costs" 
required because of corruption. « (UNODC n.d.)  
HQDS HQDs Group B 
Country 
System of 
Governance Country 
System of 
Governance 
Australia Parliamentary (1) Belgium Parliamentary (1) 
Austria Parliamentary (1) Iceland Parliamentary (2) 
Canada Parliamentary (1)  Luxembourg Parliamentary (1) 
Denmark Parliamentary (1) Malta Parliamentary (2) 
Finland Parliamentary (2) United Kingdom Parliamentary (1) 
Germany Parliamentary (1) United States Presidential (1) 
Ireland Parliamentary (3) 
Netherlands Parliamentary (1)  
New Zealand Parliamentary (1) 
Norway Parliamentary (1) 
Sweden Parliamentary (1) 
Switzerland Parliamentary  (1) (*) 
Table 10:  List of the systems of governance of the HQDs 
Sources: 
(1) Fischer Verlag 2012 
(2) EIU 2012  
(3) 1HCIA n.d 
(*) Switzerland is a unique case as described below.   
Own illustration 
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Transparency International (TI) has following definition for corruption:  
» Corruption is operationally defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI 
further differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against the rule" 
corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for 
something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, 
on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from 
providing. « (Transparency International 2011)  
While the TI definition focuses on the operational part, the definition of the UNODC 
highlights the effects and consequences of corruption and draws the linkage to democracy. 
In this case the categorization of corruption as the independent variable and the quality of 
democracy as the dependent variable in a two dimensional approach, seems to be 
legitimate.  In deed corruption is used as an indicator for the “political dimension” of the 
Democracy Ranking 2010 as well as it is one question in the section “functioning of 
government” in the public opinion surveys of the EIU 2010 which were used at the 
creation of this index. Both indexes include corruption in their assessment.  The weighting 
of corruption in both indexes is low. (Campbell 2010; EIU 2010, p. 36) The author of this 
thesis assumed that in a statistical analysis of corruption and the quality of democracy a 
relationship will occur. How strong this relationship is, is a different question – by the 
intuition of the author of this thesis, only the inclusion of corruption in to one dimension in 
each index with an insignificant weighing should have only a relatively small influence in 
the total scoring since both indexes are multidimensional and consider many factors in 
each dimension.  
In this section the relationship between corruption and the quality of democracy will be 
analyzed. By intuition corruption should have a negative impact on the quality of 
democracy. More precise the perceived corruption as measured by the Corruption 
Perception Index 2010 (CPI) of Transparency International will be used for the analysis. 
The CPI ranks countries according to the levels of perceived corruption in the public 
sector. The index combines different sources of information about corruption. It is an 
aggregate indicator which makes country comparisons possible. (Transparency 
International 2010, p. 4) 178 countries were assessed in the CPI 2010 with results that were 
drawn from 13 surveys and assessments. The index rates countries on a scale from 0 
(highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). The CPI 2010 is based on different sources from the 
years 2009 and 2010. The majority of the sources cover the year 2009. (ibid) Although the 
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perceived corruption must not equal the actual corruption in a society it will be a good 
indicator for the degree of corruption. The actual corruption in a society is probably 
impossible to measure completely and probably only a small proportion becomes public. 
A simple scatter box of the CPI 2010 with the two democracy indexes, with 67 
observations each results in the following figures. (Figures 26 and 27) Both figures and 
regression lines indicate a strong linear relationship between the CPI 2010 and the 
respectively used democracy index. The better countries performed on the CPI (high 
values) the better they also performed on the democracy indexes and vice versa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The computed correlations are strong and indicate a strong negative linear relationship 
between corruption and the quality of democracy: 0.878430 between the Democracy 
Ranking 2010 and CPI 2010 and 0.900749 between EIU 2010 and CPI 2010 – since higher 
values on the CPI mean less (perceived) corruption. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: CPI 2010 / EIU 2010 Figure 24: CPI 2010 / Democracy Ranking 2010 
Own illustration  Own illustration  
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A comparison of the HQDs shows that all of them, including Group B, do have relatively 
high scores on the CPI 2010. All of them have scores above the average of the regarded 67 
democracies which is 5.19.40 
 
Conclusion 
In this case the interpretation of the relationship is easier than in some other used variables: 
The direction of the relationship goes from corruption to quality of democracy. High 
corruption levels affect the quality of democracy negatively.41 Through this analysis it is 
not possible to elaborate the degree of influence of corruption on the quality of democracy. 
As the definition of the UNODC states corruption has negative effects on democratic 
institutions, the rule of law and governmental stability. This in turn seems to affect the 
quality of democracy.  
An interesting, although not surprising, relationship exists also between corruption and 
economic development. The CPI 2010 strongly correlates with economic output and 
income within democracies (67 observations): 0.845898 with GDP per capita 2009 and 
                                                            
40 The value for the average is based on own calculations based on the data of Transparency International. 
41 As stated before the CPI represents the perceived corruption in a country. Even if the perceived 
corruption does not equal the actual corruption it is a good indicator.  
HQDs HQDs Group B 
Country 
CPI 
2010 
Score Country 
CPI 
2010 
Score 
Australia 8.7 Belgium 7.1 
Austria 7.9 Iceland 8.5 
Canada 8.9 Luxembourg 8.5 
Denmark 9.3 Malta  5.6 
Finland 9.2 United Kingdom 7.6 
Germany 7.9 United States 7.1 
Ireland 8.0 
Netherlands 8.8 
New Zealand 9.3 
Norway 8.6 
Sweden 9.2 
Switzerland 8.7 
Table 11: CPI 2010 Scores for HQDs 
Own illustration. Source of Data: Transparency International 2010; 2011 
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0.844234 with GNI per capita PPP.42 This relationship indicates that higher levels of 
economic development is related to lower levels or (perceived) corruption. In this case it is 
likely that economic development influences the corruption levels.  
Another interesting relationship is that the CPI 2010 is highly correlated with the indicators 
of the rule of law. For 67 observations the correlations between CPI 2010 and the WGI 
Rule of Law Indicators are: 0.915973 with the percentile ranks and 0.945423 with the 
government scores. The correlation with the Rule of Law Index for 25 observations is 
0.943368.43 There is a strong positive relationship between the rule of law and corruption. 
Indeed those are the strongest correlations between (not related) variables which were 
analyzed in this thesis. The relationship is probably a mutual one. However, it will not be 
further elaborated within this thesis.  
7.2. Education 
The effects education of the citizens can have on democracy can be manifold. The 
individual and collective choices of a higher educated population would probably be 
different than the choices of a lower educated education. Especially the knowledge and 
understanding about political, economic and social conditions would probably have an 
effect on the demands made by citizens. In his book “Reason, Religion and Democracy” 
Dennis C. Müller argues that » Knowledgeable citizens are more likely to choose proper 
solutions to community problems or representatives who make the right choices. «44 
(Müller 2009, p. 318) Diamond and Morlino argue that » (…) a fundamental condition for 
widespread participation in a good democracy is broad diffusion of basic education and 
literacy, and with it a modicum of knowledge about government and public affairs. « 
(Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 24) Participation is one of the 8 dimensions the authors 
state as a “dimension of the quality of democracy”. (ibid) Another link between democracy 
and education is drawn by Sodaro:  
» As a general rule, there is close correlation between democracy, on the one hand, and 
high educational levels and multiple sources of information on the other. This positive 
correlation is consistent with our hypothesis that education and free information can help 
promote democracy. « (Sodaro 2004, p. 219)  
                                                            
42 The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.  
43 The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis. 
44 “Right choices” is not explicitly explained. Probably it means the “better choice” for the citizens – 
although a decision or a regulation does not necessarily need to satisfy all the citizens.  
64 
 
O’Donnell emphasizes the availability of information and considers » (…) the availability 
of free, pluralistic, and nonmonopolized or state-censored information (…) as a necessary 
condition for the existence of a democratic regime. « (O’Donnell 2004a, p. 37) In the 
feasibility study for a Quality Ranking of Democracy David Campbell et al remark that » 
(…) knowledge is not only being understood as supporting the economic performance, but 
knowledge is also being regarded as a crucial factor for the quality of a democracy. « 
(Campbell and Sükösd 2002, p. 6)  Also the authors remark that by a circulation of a 
broader range of “high-quality knowledge” among a high proportion of members of a 
society, the democratic quality of that society is substantially reinforced. (ibid, p. 6) As 
already quoted also Dennis Müller argues in a similar way, stating that education should 
improve the quality of collective decisions in a democracy. (Müller 2009, p. 3) 
The quoted authors argue in favor for an influence of education and knowledge on the 
occurrence and the quality of democracy. On the other hand it can be argued that a well 
functioning democracy has an effect on education or knowledge diffusion – for instance by 
offering several public education opportunities for all citizens. The relationship between 
education or knowledge and the quality of democracy is certainly not clear and it probably 
might be reciprocal. However considering the above mentioned arguments of the several 
authors a relationship from education or knowledge on the quality of democracy seem to 
be valid.  
This chapter will analyze the relationship between education and the quality of democracy. 
Measuring knowledge or education accurately is not easy and maybe only possible to a 
certain degree. However, most of the indicators measure education in a quantitative form, 
e.g. years of received education or years of compulsory education measured in years. 
Measuring education qualitatively and quantifying it afterwards is more difficult.45 
Although the significance of qualitative measures of knowledge or education would 
probably be higher for the analysis of the relationship of education and the quality of 
democracy, for the author of this thesis it is only possible to use existing and available 
data. The author of this thesis decided to us the following two indicators for the analysis: 
the literacy rate and the mean years of schooling. 46 
a) Literacy Rate 
                                                            
45 Quantitative measure of knowledge or education here means quantitative measurable variables such as 
years in school, the population’s rate of graduates, ect. Qualitative measuring here means the real level of 
knowledge or the quality of education.  
46 The selection of those two indicators is subjective based on the author’s view that they could be relevant. 
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The UNESCO defines a literate person as » (…) someone who can both read and write 
with understanding, a short, simple statement on his or her everyday life. A person who can 
only read but not write, or can write but not read is considered to be illiterate. A person 
who can only write figures, his or her name or a memorized ritual phrase is also not 
considered literate. « (UN Statistics Division 2011)  
Having a high literacy rate does not necessarily lead to democracy or vice versa for which 
Cuba and Belarus are the best examples. The question which arises is if literacy rates make 
a difference among democracies. In this section the relationship between the literacy rate 
and the quality of democracy will be analyzed. The data of the literacy rate is taken from 
the online database of the UN Statistical Division which uses the data of the UNESCO 
Institute of Statistics. The accurate values are unfortunately not available for all the 
countries due to several reasons. For some countries, especially high developed countries 
e.g. Australia, Austria and Canada, estimated rates were used. (ibid) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both graphs do not show a strong relationship between the quality of democracy and the 
adult literacy rate. Only a weak positive relationship seem to valid which is not significant. 
In deed looking at the computed correlations, the relationship can be regarded as weak or 
medium: 0.568532 between the Democracy Ranking 2010 and the adult literacy rate and 
0.412479 between the EIU 2010 and the adult literacy rate for 67 observations. 
Figure 26: Adult literacy rate 2005-2009 / 
Democracy Ranking 2010 
Figure 27: Adult literacy rate 2005-2009 / EIU 
2010
Own illustration Own illustration 
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The statistical relationship betwwen adult literacy rate and the qualtiy of democracy is not 
strong. A comparison of the HQDs show that they all do have estimated literacy rates of 99 
%. Those rates are higher than in comparison to most of the other democracies but they 
only represent estimations. (ibid) Another concept which could be more relevant than 
literacy is “functional literacy” but there is no data available.47  
 
 
b) Mean years of schooling (of adults) 
Another available measure about education is the average years of schooling of the 
population on a certain year. The “Mean years of schooling (of adults)” indicator of the 
Human Development Index (HDI) measures the » Average number of years of education 
received by people ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using 
official durations of each level.« (UNDP 2011) The data for the year 2009 of this index 
was taken from the online database of the HDR statistic website. Most of the values are 
estimates based on linear interpolation. (ibid)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
47 The UNESCO defines a person as functionally literate who can engage in all activities that require literacy 
for effective functioning of the group and community and also who is able to use of reading, writing and 
calculating for the own community’s development. (UNESCO 2011) 
Figure 29: Mean years of schooling / 
EIU 2010
Figure 28: Mean years of schooling / 
Democracy Ranking 2010 
Own illustration Own illustration 
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The graphs indicate a certain positive linear relationship between the mean of the average 
schooling education of the population above 25 and the democracy indexes. The computed 
correlations (67 observations) also do indicate a certain relationship: 0.625676 with the 
EIU 2010 and 0.753260 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 – both correlations are medium 
strong to strong meaning a certain positive relationship exists.48 The higher correlation 
with the Democracy Ranking 2010 might be explained due to the use of “knowledge” as 
one dimension of this index. The weighting of knowledge however is only 10 % and the 
indicator of the average of schooling years of the adult population above 25 was not used 
in the “knowledge” dimension but rather indicators as the school enrollment (secondary 
and tertiary) and the pupil-teacher ratio. (Campbell 2010) The correlation in the 
Democracy Ranking 2010 can not merely be explained be the “knowledge” dimension this 
index has. The EIU 2010 does not include any educational indicators except the literacy 
rate meaning that it’s correlation with the average schooling cannot be explained either by 
the conception of the index itself. (EIU 2010)       
A comparison of the HQDs and the HQDs Group B shows that the average years of 
schooling of the respective population of those countries for the age 25 and above was 
relatively high in 2009 – in comparison the global average of schooling of all countries in 
2009, of which the data is available was 7.55 years.49  
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
48 The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.  
49 The average was calculated by the author of this thesis and is based on the data of the HDI 2012 for 175 
observations. The second decimal of the value is rounded.  
HQDs HQDs Group B 
Country 
Mean Years of 
Schooling 2009 Country 
Mean Years of 
Schooling 2009 
Australia 12 Belgium 10,8 
Austria 10,6 Iceland 10,3 
Canada 12 Luxembourg 10 
0Denmark 11,3 Malta 9,9 
Finland 10,2 United Kingdom 9,2 
Germany 12,2 United States 12,4 
Ireland 11,6
Netherlands 11,5
 
New Zealand 12,5
Norway 12,6
Sweden 11,7
Switzerland 10,9
Table 12: Mean years of Schooling in HQDs 
 Own illustration. Data source: UNPD 2011 
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c) Conclusion 
A strong relationship between the literacy rate and the quality of democracy could not be 
found. The correlations (0.5685 and 0.4124) between literacy rate and the democracy 
indexes are positive and do indicate a certain relationship but this relationship can only be 
considered to be weak or medium strong.  In this case - in which the relationship between 
education and the quality of democracy is analyzed for a certain period - education can 
considered to be the independent variable, since the average education level of a society 
mostly depends on education policies from previous periods.  
The average years in schooling do not necessarily mean a higher level of education 
because the length of education does not necessarily imply anything about the quality of 
the education. However it can be used as an indication of education. Even though a certain 
relationship between this education indicator and the quality of democracy seem to exist, 
the length of the years in schooling does not necessarily reflect or indicate the quality of 
democracy: Czech Republic (12.5), Estonia (12) and Israel (11.9) have had higher averages 
in years of schooling than the majority of the HQDs. (UNDP 2011) Still it looks like, 
considering the correlations and the mean years of schooling in HQDs, that there is a 
certain positive relationship between mean years in schooling. This in turn does indicate a 
certain relationship between education and the quality of democracy. The relationship is 
possibly as the above quoted argument of Diamond and Morlino, that broad diffusion of 
basic education, literacy and certain knowledge about government and public affairs are a 
fundamental condition for widespread participation. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 24) 
Enhancing this argument it could be argued that the higher the education of a society’s 
citizens is, the better or more effective the participation of those citizens can be which in 
turn would affect the democratic quality in that society.   
 
7.3. Voter Turnout 
Participation as one dimension of the quality of democracy as suggested by Diamond and 
Morlino can occur in many different forms. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 23-24) The 
authors of the EIU 2010 consider participation to be a necessary component because 
apathy and abstention are considered to be enemies of democracy. (EIU 2010, p. 30) The 
authors of the index continue by stating the requirement of freely chosen and active 
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participation of citizens: » Democracies flourish when citizens are willing to participate in 
public debate, elect representatives and join political parties. « (ibid, p.30) 
One of the most basic forms of participation in democratic systems is, the participation of 
citizens in elections. The importance of voter turnout in democracies is often mentioned by 
various authors and political scientists. Arend Lijphart, for instance, regards low (and 
unequal) turnout as a problem which is » (…) part of a more general democratic dilemma, 
namely the conflict between two basic democratic ideals: political participation and 
political equality. « (Lijphart 1998, p. 1) The author also states that participation is unequal 
and » (…) systematically biased in favor of privileged citizens (those with better education, 
higher incomes, and greater wealth) and it is biased against less privileged citizens. « (ibid, 
p. 1) Lijphart lists five reasons to be concerned about low voter turnout:  low participation 
by less privileged citizens; unequal influence; actual turnouts tend to be lower than official 
turnout number; turnouts in elections besides on national level are particularly low; 
declining turnouts in most countries. (ibid, p. 3-5)  
In this respect the relationship between voter turnout rates and the quality of democracy 
will be analyzed. For this, again, the two democracy indexes will be used and available 
data on voter turnouts. The data is taken by the online database of the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) which according to own 
statement » (…) contains the most comprehensive global collection of voter turnout 
statistics available. « (IDEA 2010) The data of IDEA is available for two voter turnout 
rates:  (1) Voter turnout (VT): The total number of valid and invalid votes divided by the 
voters’ register in percentage. (2) VAP turnout (VAP): The total number of valid and 
invalid votes divided by the voting age population in percentage. The VAP turnout refers 
to one of the problems Lijphart listed about the actual turnouts being lower than the official 
turnouts. Also the IDEA states that the voting age population figures can provide a better 
picture of participation and that registration figures can be inaccurate or sometimes even 
unavailable. (ibid)  
The EIU 2010 includes the voter turnout (as proportion of population of voting age in 
parliamentary elections since 2000) in the assessment as one indicator out of nine in the 
category of “political participation” – if the voter turnout since 2000 was consistently 
above 70 % that country obtains one 1 point, 0.5 points if it was between 50% and 70 % 
and 0 points if the turnout was below 50 % or if voting is obligatory. (EIU 2010, p. 37) The 
authors state that a high turnout is in general regarded as » (…) evidence of the legitimacy 
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of the current system. « (ibid, p.33) It is also argued in the EIU 2010 that there is a 
correlation between turnout and overall democracy measures with a tendency of 
“developed democracies” to have higher turnout than “less established democracies”. (ibid, 
p.33)  
In this analysis the voter turnout will be regarded as an indicator of participation. Therefore 
and because of the use as indicator in the EIU 2010, voter turnout will be considered as the 
independent variable.  
The correlations between voter turnout and the democracy indexes do not show a 
significant relationship and there are only weak positive correlations: Between Democracy 
Ranking 2010 and VAP turnout the correlation is 0.256492 and it is 0.266523 (66 Obs.) 
with the voter turnout. The correlations for the EIU 2010 are 0.311760 with the VAP 
turnout and 0.370199 (66 Obs.) with the voter turnout. In both cases the EIU 2010 has a 
stronger correlation than the Democracy Ranking 2010. This might result because of the 
fact that voter turnout is one indicator in the EIU 2010. (EIU 2010) On the other hand voter 
turnout is just one out of 60 indicators in total with similar weighing and such a small 
portion of weighting of voter turnout does not necessarily need to explain the stronger 
correlation. A comparison of the HQDs does also not show a similarity. Neither all HQDs 
nor HQD Group B countries had voter turnouts or VAP turnouts that were above the 
average of all regarded 67 democracies (VT: 66.51; VAP: 63.51).50 Canada and 
Switzerland, for instance, had lower voter turnout rates and lower VAP turnout rates than 
the majority of the observed 67 democracies. Also Germany, Finland, Ireland, United 
Kingdom and United States are just in the middle of the rank of the voter turnout rates 
among the observed democracies. The only similarity is that all HQDs except Australia do 
not have compulsory voting. Also among the HQDs Group B only Belgium and 
Luxembourg do have compulsory voting.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
50 The average VT and VAP are based on own calculations of the author for the available data of the 67 
democracies.  Both values are either for the rates of elections in 2009 or of the closest elections to 2009.   
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A comparison of the regarded 67 democracies with and without compulsory voting shows 
that the average voter turnout in countries with compulsory voting (15 countries) is 74.65 
% whereas in countries without compulsory voting (52 countries) the average voter turnout 
is 64.11 %.51 The average VAP turnout rates 70.33 % in countries with and 61.54 % in 
countries without compulsory voting.52 There is a difference when the average voter 
turnout rates are regarded. However it is arguable if this difference is seen as significant. 
There are some countries with compulsory voting which have lower turnout rates than 
countries where voting is not compulsory, e.g. Mexico with 44.61 %, Dominican Republic 
with 56, 46 % and Guatemala with 60.46 % voter turnout rates.  
Conclusion 
The conclusion of this short analysis is that, at least by analyzing the elections in the years 
around 2009, there does not seem to be a relationship between voter turnouts and the 
functioning or the quality of a democracy – at least not according to the regarded 
democracy indexes.  
 
 
                                                            
51 The averages are based on own calculations using the data from the online database of IDEA.  
52 The averages are based on own calculations using the data from the online database of IDEA. 
HQDs Group B 
Country Year VT (%) 
VAP 
(%) CVP 
Belgium 2007 91,08 86 Yes
Iceland 2009 85,12 84,74 No
Luxembourg 2009 90,93 53,2 Yes
Malta 2008 93,3 98,39 No
UK 2005 61,36 58,32 No
USA 2008 64,36 57,45 No
HQDs 
Country Year VT (%) 
VAP  
(%) CPV
Australia 2007 95,17 82,74 Yes
Austria 2008 81,71 75,61 No
Canada 2008 59,52 53,59 No
Denmark 2007 86,59 83,2 No
Finland 2007 65,02 68,18 No
Germany 2009 70,78 64,61 No
Ireland 2007 67,03 68,89 No
Netherlands 2006 80,35 77,48 No
New Zealand 2008 79,46 77,84 No
Norway 2009 76,37 74,74 No
Sweden 2006 81,99 80,6 No
Switzerland 2007 48,28 39,79 No
  VT (%) VAP (%) 
Average: 66,51 63,51
Own illustrations and own calculations.  
Source of Data: IDEA 2010 
Table 13: Voter turnout of HQDs  
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7.4. Political Culture and Values 
» Democracy requires a supportive culture, the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of 
principles underlying freedom of speech, media, assembly, religion, of the rights of opposition 
parties, of the rule of law, of human rights (…) «  (Lipset 1994, p. 3) 
One aspect of all political systems including democracies is the so called “political 
culture”. A relationship between the political culture in one society and its political or 
democratic system is possible. The authors of the EIU 2010 for instance state: » A 
democratic political culture is also crucial for the legitimacy, smooth functioning and 
ultimately the sustainability of democracy. « (EIU 2010, p. 30) 
A universal definition of this term does not exist with several definitions being used by 
different authors. The Dictionary of Social Sciences defines political culture as beliefs, 
values and attitudes which underlie a society’s political system. (Oxford University Press, 
2002) The subject of political culture is especially associated with Gabriel Almond and 
Sidney Verba and their book “The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations” which was first published in 1963. (ibid) According to those two authors the 
term refers to » (…) the specifically political orientations — attitudes toward the political 
system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. (…) It 
is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes. « (Almond and 
Verba 1989, p.12)  When speaking about the political culture of a society Almond and 
Verba refer to » (…) the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and 
evaluations of its population. « (ibid, p. 13) Political orientation refers according to the 
authors to internalized aspects of objects and relationships and includes “cognitive 
orientation” (knowledge and beliefs about the political system), “affective orientation” 
(feelings about the political system) and “evaluational orientation” (judgments and 
opinions about political objects). (ibid, p. 14)  
Analyzing and comparing political culture in a comprehensive manner is probably difficult 
since there neither seems to be a universal definition for political culture nor there is a 
complete dataset on it – measuring political culture completely is high likely a difficult 
task. 
Nevertheless Inglehart and Weizel tried to find an empirical linkage between “self-
expression values” which they regard as one dimension of political culture and effective 
democracy. (Inglehart and Weizel 2003, p. 64-76) By referring to Lipset and Almond and 
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Verba and affirming them, the authors argue that » (…) a specific type of political culture 
seems to be an essential precondition of effective democracy. « (ibid, p. 62) Self-
expression values are defined as a syndrome of mass attitudes which commonly reflect 
emphasis on freedom, participation and tolerance of diversity at individual and aggregate 
levels. (ibid, p. 64) According to the authors the presence of self-expression values in a 
political culture is shown when liberty, public self-expression, participation, interpersonal 
trust, life satisfaction and tolerance of diversity are emphasized by the public. (ibid, p. 64) 
Inglehart and Weizel argue that opinions which might be favorable for democracy are not 
sufficient for the presence of effective democracy at societal level unless they are 
accompanied by more deeply rooted tolerance, participation and trust. (ibid, p. 62) The 
authors find a strong linkage between self-expression values and effective democracy 
within their statistical analysis. The self-expression values were calculated with the 
aggregated data set of the second and third World Values Survey (WVS).53 (ibid, p. 76-77) 
Effective democracy is measured by a combination of freedom rights and elite integrity: 
Effective democracy equals freedom rights (percentages) multiplied with elite integrity 
(fractions of 1.0). (ibid, p. 67) For measuring freedom rights the authors use combined 
scores for civil and political rights of Freedom House and for elite integrity the use 
standardized and revised scores of the corruption perception indexes by Transparency 
International.54 (ibid, p. 67) In the analysis effective democracy is regarded as the 
dependent variable and the authors find a strong linkage: the attitudes on self-expression 
values in a society in about 1990 explain 75 % of the variations in effective democracy for 
the years 1999-2000 between countries. Furthermore the effect of self-expression values 
seems to remain robust even if the variables of economic development, support for 
democracy and the experience with democracy are controlled. (ibid, p. 69) In contrary the 
length of time under democratic institutions experienced by a society » (…) adds very little 
to the effect of self-expression values on effective democracy. « (ibid, p. 70) Another result 
the authors draw from their statistical analysis is the implication that » (…) self-expression 
values do not result from the presence of preexisting democratic institutions. « (ibid, p. 70) 
They conclude that a political culture that emphasizes self-expression values (self-
expression, trust, tolerance, participation and life satisfaction) plays a crucial role in 
effective democracy and that » (…) components of self-expression values seems to be 
essential to the flourishing of democratic institutions. « (ibid, p.76) The authors regard 
                                                            
53 The second WVS was generated about 1990. The third WVS was generated about 1995. Missing values for 
the second WVS were estimated with the data of the third WVS. 
54 The maximum value for the scores of „Effective Democracy“ is 100.  
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effective democratic institutions as a consequence and not as a precondition of a 
“democratic mass culture”. Another interesting link the authors draw is that economic 
development tends to promote an increase in self-expression values which in turn tend to 
fuel effective democracy. (ibid, p.76)  
Even if the results of Inglehart and Weizel do not reflect the influence of political culture 
in total; they indicate a relationship between a certain aspect of political culture and 
(effective) democracy. The link between economic development, self-expression values 
and effective democracy would indicate an indirect relationship from economical 
development on effective democracy. Although effective democracy is not interchangeable 
with the quality of democracy - especially if the used measuring method is regarded - this 
result could be an indirect explanation for the direction of the previously found relationship 
between the indicators for economic output or income with the democracy rankings. 
Values might have an influence on the political system or on democracy as Inglehart and 
Weizel suggest. The exact relationship between values and the political system is not clear 
since both could influence each other. Also as the authors showed a relationship between 
economical development and values might exist. Hence values will be elaborated and 
analyzed.  
Based on empirical cross-cultural research Shalom Schwartz proposed a “theory of the 
universal content and structure of human values” and he defines values as » (…) desirable 
transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding 
principles in the life of a person or other social entity. « (Schwartz 1994, p. 21) Schwartz 
regards the following implicit four points in this definition of values as goals:  
» (1) they serve the interests of some social entity, (2) they 
can motivate action—giving it direction and emotional intensity, (3) they function as 
standards for judging and justifying action, and (4) they are acquired both 
through socialization to dominant group values and through the unique learning 
experiences of individuals. « (ibid, p.21)  
At the end of their research Schwartz and his coauthors find 10 motivationally distinct 
types of values which they claim to be universal values: Power, Achievement, Hedonism, 
Stimulation, Self-direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and 
Security. (ibid, p.22) In his paper Schwartz explains the reasons for the derivation of those 
values. Also the author states that values represent responses to three universal 
75 
 
requirements with which individuals and societies have to cope:  » (…) needs of 
individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and 
requirements for the smooth functioning and survival of groups. « (ibid, p. 21)  
The work of Schwartz and his coauthors is pretty interesting and surely can be regarded as 
important – An analysis about (the quality of) democracy with the usage of the universal 
values of Schwartz would be highly interesting and a potential question for further 
research. If values serve as guiding principles for a person or other social entities as well as 
they can motivate action, as Schwartz’s definition suggest, than values certainly would 
influence the behavior of human beings. The behavior of citizens of a democracy would 
probably affect its functioning since competition and participation are regarded as 
dimensions of democracy quality in the framework of Diamond and Morlino and those two 
dimensions probably not only depend on the capacities and capabilities of people but also 
on there will. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) Unfortunately, there is no dataset with 
the cross-country comparison according the universal values of Schwartz.  
Measuring and comparing values is surely a difficult undertaking and it could be criticized 
as well. However, an analysis of the values and the quality of democracy requires data 
about values. A possible dataset for a comparison is the data on “cultural dimension” of 
Geert Hofstede. Hofstede did a survey among the international company IBM in around 
1970 (IBM survey) regarding peoples behavior in large organizations. Later on, when he 
found time for research, he worked on the data and analyzed it for a couple years. As a 
result Hofstede derived from the IBM survey conclusions on the general culture of 
societies in different countries of which he created cultural dimensions. The included 
countries are ordinal rated with scores on each cultural dimension. According to Hofstede 
and his co-authors the study was replicated a couple of times finding similar results as the 
IBM survey which is regarded by the authors as a confirmation of the results of the initial 
study. (Hofstede et al 2010, p. 34-35) The authors also remark that » The success of the 
replications does not necessarily mean that the countries' cultures did not change since the 
IBM research, but if they changed, they changed together, so that their relative position 
remained intact. « (ibid, p. 34) Further the authors argue that the national dimension scores 
of the IBM survey or at least their relative positions have remained valid in the year 2010 
as they were in around 1970. (ibid, p. 39) Hofstede states on his website that the dimension 
scores of the countries are relative and that without a comparison a single score of a 
country is meaningless. (Hofstede n.d.)  
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Hofstede et al define values differently than Schwartz: » Values are broad tendencies to 
prefer certain states of affairs over others. Values are feelings with an added arrow 
indicating a plus and a minus side. « (Hofstede, et al 2010, p. 9) According to Hofstede et 
al values form the core of culture “surrounded by” practices as rituals, heroes and symbols. 
(ibid, p. 7-9) Culture, which is learned through the social environment, is regarded to be in 
between “human nature” and “personality”. (ibid, p. 5-7) The authors argue that practices 
might change but that the values of a society do only change slowly and they even state 
that » National value systems should be considered given facts, as hard as a country's 
geographical position or its weather. « (ibid, p. 18-20)  
The relativity of the dimension scores and their stable relative positions over time would 
allow a comparison of democracies with the two democracy indexes used in this thesis. 
Even if the democracy indexes rate countries for the year 2009 and therefore a different 
period than Hofestede did, the values of the cultural dimensions would be regarded 
“relatively” and therefore the results would not differ much even if the data of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions is not up to date. This chapter will analyze the relationship between 
values and the quality of democracy by using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the two 
democracy indexes.  
A dimension is regarded by the authors as » (…) an aspect of a culture that can be 
measured relative to other cultures. (…) A dimension groups together a number of 
phenomena in a society that were empirically found to occur in combination (…) « (ibid, p. 
31) The cultural dimension scores of Hofstede are country average values based on the 
results of the IBM survey and the later added dimensions were calculated on results of the 
World Value Survey (WVS). The validity of the survey - even though it has a very specific 
sample (IBM employees) – is explained by the fact that the employees represent an almost 
perfectly matched sample since they were similar in all respects except nationality and 
therefore the effect of “nationality differences” in the answers become evident clearly. 
(ibid, p. 30) Four dimensions of culture were formed: power distance (PDI), femininity 
versus masculinity (MAS), uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and collectivism versus 
individualism (IDV). (ibid, p. 31)  A fifth dimension was added later based on the findings 
of the Chinese Value Survey (CVS) first and then based on the WVS. It was labeled: long-
term versus short term orientation (LTO). (ibid, p. 236 – 239) Also based on scores from 
the WVS a sixth and final dimension was added: Indulgence Versus Restraint (IVR). (ibid, 
p. 78 – 81) The scale of the values for all dimensions is between 0 and about 100.  
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A statistical analysis with the data from Hofstede et al and the democracy indexes show 
only significant correlations (compare Table 13) for two out of the six dimensions. The 
dimensions of power distance (PDI) and individualism versus collectivism (IDV) have 
significant correlations with both of the democracy indexes. In both cases the number of 
included observations is only 51 because the value scores for 13 countries were not 
available. In addition the values for Belgium, Switzerland and South Africa were not 
included in the analysis because Belgium and Switzerland had two value scores each 
according to the (main) spoken languages with the scores differing from each other. South 
Africa included only the average values of the “white population”. Therefore the author of 
this thesis decided to exclude them from the statistical analysis.     
The graphs for both dimensions with the democracy indexes indicate a positive linear 
relationship for individualism and a negative linear relationship for power distance with the 
quality of democracy. 
 
 
 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
Power distance is defined by the authors as » (…) the extent to which the less 
powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally. « (ibid, p. 61) Hofstede refers about power 
distance also to “the less powerful members of a society” instead of “institutions and 
organizations”. (Hofstede n.d.) The scale reaches from about 0 to about 100. 55 A large 
degree of power distance (high values) indicates that people in those societies accept a 
                                                            
55 Malaysia and Slovakia were added later on this dimension and have PDI values above 100. (ibid, p. 56) 
Figure 31: Individualism Index (IDV)   / Democracy 
Ranking 2010 Figure 30: Individualism Index (IDV)   / EIU 2010 
Own illustration Own illustration 
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hierarchical order without a need of further justification. Low power distance (low values) 
on the opposite indicates that people in those societies demand justification for inequalities 
and strive to equalize the distribution of power. (ibid) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The PDI has correlation of -0.728580 with the EIU 2010 and -0.722469 with the 
Democracy Ranking 2010. These results indicate a negative relationship between power 
distance and the quality of democracy, as measured by the respective indexes. In societies 
with relatively high ratings on democracy quality the power distance on average seems to 
be relatively low - since Hofstede et al stated that the value score must be regarded 
relatively.  
The dimension of individualism is defined by Hofstede et al as follows:  
»Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: 
everyone is expected to look after him- or herself and his or her immediate family. 
Collectivism as its 
opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, 
cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty. « (Hofstede et al 2010, p. 92) 
The correlations of the IDV are 0.676338 with the EIU 2010 and 0.729946 with the 
Democracy Ranking 2010. The results indicate a positive relationship between 
Figure 32: Power Distance Index (PDI)   / EIU 2010 Figure 33: Power Distance Index (PDI)   / Democracy 
Ranking 2010 
Own illustration  Own illustration  
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individualism and the quality of democracy, at least according to the indexes. The 
relationship is medium strong. Societies with relatively high ratings on the democracy 
indexes seem to have relatively high individualism values on average.  
Both dimensions, IDV and PDI, are based on the IBM survey which was initially done 
around 1970 and its replications with the latest listed replication study in 2002. It is not 
explicitly stated how much each dimension is based on the IBM survey and how much is 
based on the replications, except that the PDI is based on three items from the IBM survey 
plus extensions and the IDV is based on 14 items from the IBM survey plus extensions. 
(ibid, p.56-63, p. 94-99)  
However, the data about the values is not up to date itself or does not refer explicitly to the 
year 2009 as the democracy indexes do. As stated above the authors argue that societal 
values tend to stay solid over time and do not change and if they changed, they probably 
changed together and their relative positions remained the same. (ibid, p.34) Assuming this 
to be correct the analysis can be done in relative terms and should be regarded as such.  
 
 
 
Comparing the HQDs shows that they have similarities in the power distance (PDI) and 
individualistic (IDV) value dimensions: All of the HQDs, except the French speaking part 
of Switzerland, have relatively low power distance scores and score lower than the average 
of included democracies (56.11) of which the value score were available. All HQDs Group 
B countries, except Belgium and Malta, have relatively low PDI scores too and lie lower 
than the average as well. Low average values on the power distance dimension, as most of 
Correlation Analysis                                          Sample: 67                              Pairwise samples 
Dimensions of Values IDV PDI IVR LTO UAI MAS 
Democracy Ranking 
2010 
0.729946 -0.722469 0.204072 0.188500 -0.256086 -0.197774
Observations 51 51 54 55 49 51
EIU 2010  
0.676338 -0.728580 0.328527 0.117299 -0.441589 -0.191832
Observations 51 51 54 55 49 51
Own illustration and own calculations. 
Table 14: Correlations of Hofstede’s dimension with Democracy Indexes  
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the HQDs have, indicate that the less powerful members in a society do not accept and 
expect unequal distribution of power. There seems to be a similarity on the indulgence 
versus restraint (IVR) dimension as well. This dimension will be neglected due to reasons 
explained below. 
Diamond and Morlino argue that political culture is a supporting condition for the 
dimension of participation and that it should value participation as well as the equal worth 
and dignity of all citizens. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 24)  If cultural values, as 
measured by Hofstede et al, do affect the political system through the behavior of its 
citizens, than low power distance values in a society could indeed affect the quality of 
democracy because the people in this society would generally not accept or tolerate 
unequal distributed power. (Hofstede et al 2010, p. 61; Hostede n.d.) Hofstede et al do in 
deed argue for societal and political consequences of large power distance values:  
» In a society in which power distances are large, authority tends to be traditional, 
sometimes even rooted in religion. Power is seen as a basic fact of society that precedes the 
choice between good and evil. Its legitimacy is irrelevant. Might prevails over right. This is 
a strong statement that may rarely be presented in this form but is reflected in the behavior 
of those in power and of ordinary people. There is an unspoken consensus that there should 
be an order of inequality in this world, in which everybody has his or her place. Such an 
order satisfies people's need for dependence, and it gives a sense of security both to those 
in power and to those lower down. « (Hostede el al 2010, p. 76-77) 
No tolerating unequal distributed power probably would people make act or behave in 
ways not supporting or facilitating unequal power distribution. It also would be more likely 
that power of other people who have it is questioned and this would make “strive” or 
competition for power more likely. Regarding the dimensions of democracy quality of 
Diamond and Morlino, this could affect the dimensions competition and possibly also 
participation with an increase in both dimensions. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p.21 ) 
On the individualism dimension HQDs also have a similarity: all have relatively moderate 
high or high IDV average scores which are above the average of all measured democracies 
(48.83) of which the values were available. This indicates by the definition of Hofstede et 
al that in those societies the ties between individuals are loose and that everyone is 
expected to look after themselves. If values are the core of practices than people in more 
individualistic societies would probably have practices reflecting those values. (Hofstede et 
al 2010, p. 7-10)   The expectation that every individual should take care of him- or herself 
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HQ Ds PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO IVR
AUS 38 90 61 51 21 71
AUT 11 55 79 70 60 63
CAN 39 80 52 48 36 68
DNK 18 74 16 23 35 70
FIN 33 63 26 59 38 57
DEU 35 67 66 65 83 40
IRL 28 70 68 35 24 65
NLD 38 80 14 53 67 68
NZL 22 79 58 49 33 75
NOR 31 69 8 50 35 55
SWE 31 71 5 29 53 78
SWZ (1) 70 / 26 64 / 69 58 / 72 70 / 56 74 66
HQ Ds 
Group B PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO IVR
BEL (2) 67 / 61 72 / 78 60 / 43 93 / 97 82 57
ISL N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 28 67
LUX 40 60 50 70 64 56
MLT 56 59 47 96 47 66
UK 35 89 66 35 51 69
USA 40 91 62 46 26 68
could make practicing the representation of ones own interest more likely instead of 
relying on “other members of the group”. This case would probably foster participation 
and competition as well. Again as both are seen as dimensions of the quality of democracy 
this could lead to an increase in the democracy quality in a country.  
As Figure 14 illustrates all 12 HQDs, besides the French speaking part of Switzerland, are 
located in the bottom left quadrant of the 2 axis graph with relatively low power distance 
values and relatively moderate high to high individualistic values. The same is valid for the 
countries of the HQD Group B except Belgium and Malta which are situated at the bottom 
right quadrant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A certain similarity seems to be on the dimension indulgence versus restraint (IVR) as 
well. All HQDs and HQD Group B countries have moderately high average value scores 
which are above the average of regarded democracies (48.7). Higher average scores on this 
dimension indicates indulgence to be more common in that society, which stands for: » 
(…) a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires 
Table 16: Averages of all incl. 
Democracies 
 
PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO IVR 
56.11 48.83 48.68 69.25 48 48.70 
 
 
. 
Table 15: Hofstede’s Value Scores for HQDs
(1) The first value is for the French speaking 
population. The second value is for the German 
speaking population.  
 
(2) The first value is for the French speaking 
population. The second value is for the Dutch 
speaking population.  
Own illustration and own calculations based 
on available scores of the analyzed (67) 
democracies from Hofstede et al 2010 
Own illustration. Source: Hofstede et al 2010 
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related to enjoying life and having fun. «56 (ibid, p. 281) The author of this thesis can not 
draw any relationship between indulgence and the quality of democracy. Regarding the 
definition of indulgence makes a relationship between both unlikely which is the reason 
this dimension was neglected above. 57 
The other dimensions of Hofstede et al do not show similarities among HQDs and are 
therefore not really relevant in this context. For the reason of completeness they will be 
explained briefly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Masculinity index (MAS): societies with clearly distinct emotional gender roles are called 
“masculine” whereas societies with overlapping emotional gender roles are called 
“feminine”. (ibid, p. 140) Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) is the extent to which members of 
a society feel threatened by unknown situations. (ibid, p. 191) Long-term orientation 
                                                            
56 Hofstede et al state that the gratification of desires refers to enjoying life and having fun and not to a 
general gratification of human desires. (Hofstede et al p.281)  
57 The fact that the author of this thesis could not find or draw a relationship between this cultural value 
dimension and the quality of democracy does not mean that it is not generally possible.  
Source: Hofstede et al 2010
Figure 34: Power Distance versus Individualism
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(LTO) stands for fostering virtues oriented towards future rewards whereas shot-term 
orientation refers to fostering virtues related to the past and present. (ibid, p. 239) Another 
different definition for LTO is given on the website of Hofstede, in which this dimension is 
interpreted as the way of a society deals with the search for virtue. (Hofstede n.d.) 
Conclusion 
The analyzed data indicates a certain relationship although the correlations are not so 
strong. The relationship between societal values and the quality of democracy is not 
exactly clear. 
In the case of the dimensions of Hofstede et al the authors find two factors which can 
predict the individualistic dimension (IDV): the country’s wealth with richer countries 
being associated with higher individualism and the geographical latitude with countries 
closer to the equator being associated with lower individualism. In the original IBM 
Survey the GNI explained according to the authors 71 % of the differences in IDV scores. 
(Hofstede et al 2010, p. 132) In this case relationship could be both ways. However the 
authors come to the conclusion by comparing data over time that causality of national 
wealth causing individualism is more plausible: » When a country's wealth increases, its 
citizens get access to resources that allow them to do their own thing. « (ibid, p. 132)  
In the case of the power distance dimension (PDI) the authors also find factors that can 
predict the PDI scores: the geographic latitude of the country (43 %) with higher latitudes 
being associated with lower PDI scores, the population size with larger size being 
associated with lower PDI scores, and the wealth of a country with richer countries being 
associated with lower PDI scores - national wealth plus population size together predicted 
58 % of the PDI scores. In the case of the geographic location it is considered to be the 
cause. In the case of national wealth the causality is not clear, as the authors argue. For the 
relationship of the population size with the PDI the authors argue that the size of 
population fosters dependence on authority but they also state that reverse causality could 
be possible. In the case of the IDV at least wealth seems to be likely to be an influence 
factor. (ibid, p. 84-86) 
The relationship between societal values, the democratic system and the quality of 
democracy could exist in three ways: (1) the political or democratic system could affect the 
values of that society (2) the values of the society could affect the political system together 
with the quality of democracy (3) the relationship between the political or democratic 
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system and the values of the society could be reciprocal. In the first case the values of the 
society would not affect the political or democratic system. Therefore, they would not be a 
factor that might influence the functioning or the quality of democracy.  
If an influence of wealth on individualistic values is possible, the same effect could 
account for the political or democratic system as well. This possible effect could account 
for the political or democratic system as well.  
Even if the relationship is reciprocal than the democratic system would have had an 
influence on the societal values but only over certain time, since according to the authors 
mentioned above values do change slowly. On contrary the effect of the existing average 
value structure of a society on democracy would be subject to the respective period which 
is regarded. In this case, even if the democratic system had an influence on the societal 
values, those would affect the quality of democracy in a certain period.  
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8. Conclusion 
The framework of Diamond and Morlino with its eight dimensions of the quality of 
democracy is helpful for the analysis and in interpreting the relationships: the rule of law, 
participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, freedom, 
equality and responsiveness. Considering each dimension as a variable on which the 
quality of democracies varies, allows an analysis as done within this thesis. The list of the 
dimensions might not be complete and additional dimensions can probably be added. 
(Diamond and Morlino 2005, p. 21-22) 
The results of the analyzed factors differ from each other. The results for some factors, in 
respect to the correlations, are more significant than others. The influence of some factors 
is lower than initially expected by the author of this thesis. Interpreting the results of the 
analyzed factors in terms of an influence on the functioning or quality of democracy is not 
simple: Some factors can be assumed to be the independent variables. On the contrary it is, 
unfortunately, not possible to assume the same for other factors and their relationship with 
the quality of democracy is not exactly clear. Even in the cases in which certain indicators 
were assumed to be the independent variables, it is possible to argue for the opposite. 
Therefore all found results and relationships are open for discussion. However, there are 
indications that the functioning or the quality of democracy is influenced by certain factors. 
Table 16 is visualizing the influence on or the relationship with the quality of democracy, 
for the three cases: (1) an influence on the quality of democracy exists, at least this is 
indicated by the analysis within this thesis; (2) no significant influence could be verified 
within the analysis within this thesis; (3) and a relationship to the quality of democracy 
exists but the causality is not clear and the causality could not be discovered within this 
thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be argued that history matters and that democratic traditions and experiences in 
democracy affect the quality of democracy. Surly it might take some time for countries to 
achieve a certain level of democracy quality after a transition to democracy from another 
political system, e.g. an authoritarian system: The establishment of necessary institutions 
and their functioning, the formation of separations of power including the education of the 
legal personnel, the establishment of a free and independent press and the adaptation of the 
citizens. History, the evolvement of the system, and the development do probably have an 
influence on the democratic development and possibly on the quality of democracy. 
Especially the influence of certain factors could accumulate or they might have an 
influence after accumulation. Still the author of this thesis thinks it is not the determining 
factor. However, history does not explain why some of the “newer” democracies have 
better ratings on the democracy indexes and are therefore regarded as having a higher 
Factors / Indicators 
(1) 
Influence 
on the 
Quality of 
Democracy 
 
(2) 
No 
(significant) 
influence on 
the Quality 
of 
Democracy 
(3) 
Relationship 
exists, but 
the causality 
is not clear 
State Fragility (State Fragility Index)     X 
Press Freedom (Press Freedom Index) X      
State Failure (Failed State Index)     X 
Corruption (CPI)  X      
Rule of Law (WGI Indicator + Rule of Law Index)  X      
Political Rights & Civil Liberties (Freedom House) X      
System of Governance X      
Voter Turnout    X    
Economic Output / Income (GDP & GNI PPP per 
capita)   X 
Income distribution (Gini coefficient)   X    
Mean years of Scooling X      
Adult Literacy Rate (15+)   X    
Oil Prodcution and Export   X    
Individualistic Values     X 
Power Distance Values     X 
Own illustration  
Table 17: Overview of the results of the analyzed factors 
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quality of democracy as “older” democracies, e.g. the Czech Republic ranks better on the 
EIU 2010 than the United States and the United Kingdom.  
In the following the factors that do have an influence will be concluded first. Then a 
conclusion will be drawn for the factors which do have a relationship with the quality of 
democracy but where the causality is not clear. Finally the factors that turned out not have 
an influence will be summarized.    
Press freedom, which is considered to be independent variable, seems to have an influence 
on the quality of democracy although this relationship is lower than initially expected by 
the author of this thesis. The correlations of the democracy indexes with the Press Freedom 
Index of -0.660552 and -0.584652 can only be interpreted as medium strong.  
Corruption, as indicated by the Corruption Perceptions Index, is strongly correlated with 
the quality of democracy, at least according to the two used democracy indexes. In this 
case corruption can be considered as the independent variable which has an influence on 
the quality of democracy, possibly by undermining democratic institutions and the rule of 
law.  
The rules of law indicators also have a strong positive correlation with the democracy 
indexes. The correlation those indicators have with the CPI is even stronger, which 
indicates the above mentioned relationship of corruption with the quality of democracy 
through undermining the rule of law. The rule of law can be regarded as the independent 
variable showing causality that significantly influences the quality of democracy.  
The relationship between the Freedom in the World Survey, which is an indicator for 
political rights and civil liberties, and the democracy indexes can be interpreted as medium 
strong to strong. The arguments of Diamond and Morlino allow drawing the relationship 
from political right and civil liberties to the quality of democracy which they seem to 
influence.  
The system of governance, more precise a parliamentary system, does seem to have an 
influence on the quality of democracy: Not only all HQDs, except the USA in HQD Group 
B, have a parliamentary systems but also the vast majority of countries which rank among 
the top 30 of one of the two democracy indexes.  In this case the system of governance is 
the independent variable. A possible reason for the influence of a parliamentary system on 
the quality of democracy could be similar as suggested by Gerring, that parliamentarism 
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has a tendency of offering better conflict solving tools, integration of diversity of views 
and greater incentives for actors to reach agreement. However, it is likely that the effects of 
parliamentarism cumulate over time. (Gerring et al 2009, p. 354) 
The medium strong correlations between the mean years of schooling and the democracy 
indexes indicate a certain positive relationship between education and the quality of 
democracy – although the mean years of schooling does not necessarily provide 
information about the quality of the received education it can be seen as an indicator for 
the average education level. The argument of Diamond and Morlino is in favor for the 
influence of education on the quality of democracy as they regard broad diffusion of 
education, among others, as a condition for widespread participation in a good democracy. 
(Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 24) Education, at least if a certain period is regarded, can 
be considered as the independent variable because the average education level of a society 
in one period depends on decisions in education policies of previous periods.  
The relationship between economic output and income with the quality of democracy is 
not clear. A strong positive relationship between GDP per capita and GNI per capita PPP 
and the democracy indexes does exist with correlations of above 0.8 for both variables on 
both democracy indexes. Although there are several authors that argue for the relationship 
being from economics to democracy, the relationship from economic output and income on 
the quality of democracy can not be verified. However, all HQDs do have high economic 
development as measured by GDP and GNI. If the causality is from economic 
development to the quality of democracy, a possible explanation could be that increasing 
wealth increase the possibilities of the citizens which could increase the level of 
participation, which in turn would influence the quality of democracy. (ibid, p.23-24) 
Considering the Failed State Index as an indicator for state failure, a strong relationship to 
the quality of democracy exists. There are arguments for state failure hindering the 
democratization but the causality between state failure and the quality of democracy, 
within democracies, is not exactly clear. A relationship of state failure influencing the 
functioning or the quality of democracy seems likely but cannot be verified. An influence 
would probably occur due the decrease in the monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
which in turn would probably affect the rule of law (law enforcement) negatively. The FSI 
2010 has high negative correlations with both rule of law indicators. The negative 
relationship with the rule of law would in turn affect the quality of democracy. An increase 
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in “state failure” would probably immediately affect the quality of democracy whereas vice 
versa the effects would not be as instantaneously.  
The relationship between state fragility at least as measured by the State Fragility Index 
and the quality of democracy is not clear and could not be elaborated. However, a possible 
relationship could be that state fragility negatively influences the rule of law which in turn 
has negative effects on the quality of democracy.     
The analysis between values and the quality of democracy shows a certain relationship 
between individualist and power distance values, as defined by Hofstede et al, and the 
quality of democracy. The correlations between those two value dimensions and the two 
democracy indexes are medium strong. A positive relationship of individualistic values and 
a negative relationship of power distance values with the quality of democracy, at least 
according to the indexes, seem to exist.  
The relationship between values and the quality of democracy is not clear and could not be 
elaborated within this thesis. However, all HQDs have similarities on both value 
dimensions: All HQDs and HQD Group B countries have relatively high individualist 
values – all are above the average of all considered democracies. Additionally all HQDs 
and HQD Group B countries - except the French speaking population of Switzerland, 
Belgium and Malta - have relatively low power distance values and are below the average 
of all included democracies. If values do influence the functioning or the quality of 
democracy, than low power distance values (unequal power distribution is not accepted by 
the less powerful members of society) would make people act in ways that do not support 
or facilitate unequal power distribution. That in turn could lead to more competition and 
participation. Individualistic values (individuals are expected to look after themselves and 
their immediate family) could make practicing the representation of the own interests more 
likely which again probably would increase the dimensions participation and competition. 
Since both are considered to be dimensions of the quality of democracy the behavior 
guided by those values could influence the functioning or the quality of democracy. 
(Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21; Hofstede et al 2010, p. 53-133) 
For the factors of voter turnout, income distribution, adult literacy, and oil production as 
well as exports, either no influence on the quality of democracy was found within the 
statistical analysis in this thesis or the relationships were not significant.  
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HQDs still have a certain similarity in the income distribution: They have relatively equal 
income distributions (low income Gini coefficients) in comparison to the global average, 
except for the USA. If the income distribution should have an influence on the quality of 
democracy it probably would be after reaching certain income levels.  
The so called “curse of oil” does seem to apply in terms of the occurrence of democracy as 
a system of government but it either does not have an effect on the quality of democracy 
for countries that are already democratic or this relationship cannot be elaborated since 
most of the democracies do not have a significant oil production.  
Surprisingly no significant relationship between voter turnout and the quality of democracy 
could be found. Neither the correlations were significant enough nor did the HQDs have 
similarities in the voter turnout rates. The only similarity was that the majority of the 
HQDs including HQD Group B countries, except Australia, Belgium and Luxembourg, do 
not have compulsory voting. 
The adult literacy rate did not show a significant relationship (correlations) in the statistical 
analysis. The only similarity is that all HQDs and HQD Group B countries have estimated 
literacy rates of 99 %.  
The interpretation of the results can occur in different ways. Some factors, as reflected by 
the respective indicators, seem to have an influence on the functioning or the quality of 
democracy. It is likely that those factors are linked to each other, as Diamond and Morlino 
argue:  
»Although it is possible to identify different types of lower-quality democracy, which are 
deficient in different qualities, the various dimensions are closely linked and tend to move 
together, either toward democratic improvement and deepening or toward decay. « 
(Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 28-29)  
The authors also state that when democracies are very weak on certain dimensions, they 
tend to be deficient on others as well. (ibid, p. 29) This phenomenon can also be observed 
by the medium strong and strong correlations between some of the analyzed indexes and 
indicators. (Table A 6 in Appendix)  
For clearer interpretations of the relationships further research would be necessary, 
especially within those factors in which the relationships could not be verified. In those 
cases an analysis over time, that includes several periods, would be more accurate. While 
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this thesis was written the new versions of the democracy indexes were published. A time 
comparison of the factors of which the relationship remained unclear with the democracy 
indexes would be highly interesting and probably it would deliver more solid findings.  
An example could be the analysis of the relationship between economic development and 
the quality of democracy for several periods, when the democracy indexes and the data are 
available. The analyzed year 2009 was also the year (in the aftermath) of the subprime 
mortgage crisis. The recent financial crisis effected the economies of many countries and 
led to certain extend to populism as well as it had an effect on politics. The EIU 2010 
states to this matter as:   
»However, there has been a decline in democracy across the world since 2008. The 
decades-long global trend in democratisation had previously come to a halt in what Larry 
Diamond (2008) called a “democratic recession”. Now democracy is in retreat. The 
dominant pattern in all regions over the past two years has been backsliding on previously 
attained progress in democratisation. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 
accentuated some existing negative trends in political development. « (EIU 2010, p. 1)  
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APPENDIX 
Table A 1: Rank of Top 50 countries by their GDP per capita 2009 (U.S Dollars 2011) 
Rank Country  GDP p C 2009 Rank Country  
GDP p C 
2009 
1 Monaco 172676,34 26 Singapore 37789,61
2 Liechtenstein 134914,67 27 United Kingdom 35163,41
3 Luxembourg 104353,69 28 Italy 35073,32
4 Bermuda 88746,89 29 Spain 31891,39
5 Norway 76763,74 30 Hong Kong SAR, China 29881,81
6 Switzerland 63568,24 31 Cyprus 29427,91
7 Qatar 61531,69 32 New Zealand 29352,45
8 Denmark 55933,35 33 Greece 28520,96
9 Ireland 49737,93 34 Brunei Darussalam 27390,05
10 Netherlands 47998,27 35 Israel 26102,35
11 United States 45758,10 36 Slovenia 24051,04
12 Austria 45638,09 37 Greenland 22507,89
13 Faeroe Islands 45205,93 38 Portugal 22026,76
14 Finland 45084,64 39 Bahamas, The 20916,28
15 Belgium 43799,18 40 Malta 19727,46
16 Sweden 43471,68 41 Czech Republic 18136,85
17 Australia 42130,82 42 Equatorial Guinea 17944,40
18 Kuwait 41364,69 43 Bahrain 17608,83
19 France 40663,05 44 Oman 17280,10
20 Germany 40275,25 45 Korea, Rep. 17109,99
21 Macao SAR, China 40105,21 46 Slovak Republic 16125,81
22 Canada 39643,79 47 Trinidad and Tobago 14748,18
23 Japan 39456,44 48 Estonia 14374,55
24 United Arab Emirates 38959,81 49 Croatia 14322,61
25 Iceland 38032,66 50 Antigua and Barbuda 14272,99
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own illustration. Source: World Bank 2011a  
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Table A 2: Rank of Top 50 countries by their GNI per capita PPP 2009 (internat. Dollars 2011) 
Rank Country  
GNI p. C. PPP 
2009 Rank Country 
GNI p. C. PPP 
2009  
1 Luxembourg 59590 26 Greece 28500
2 Macao SAR, China 57850 27 New Zealand 28050
3 Norway 55390 28 Korea, Rep. 27250
4 Brunei Darussalam 49730 29 Slovenia 27030
5 Singapore 49430 30 Israel 26850
6 Switzerland 47010 31 Equatorial Guinea 25310
7 United States 45640 32 Oman 24960
8 Hong Kong SAR, China 44270 33 Bahamas, The 24580
9 Netherlands 39690 34 Czech Republic 24060
10 Austria 38400 35 Portugal 24050
11 Australia 38380 36
Trinidad and 
Tobago 23800
12 Denmark 38360 37 Malta 23160
13 Sweden 37830 38 Saudi Arabia 22540
14 Canada 37280 39 Slovak Republic 22100
15 Germany 36830 40 Hungary 19260
16 Belgium 36610 41 Croatia 19250
17 Finland 35910 42 Estonia 19120
18 United Kingdom 35640 43 Seychelles 18990
19 France 33940 44 Barbados 18830
20 Ireland 32970 45 Russian Federation 18260
21 Japan 32880 46 Poland 18200
22 Italy 31930 47 Latvia 17400
23 Spain 31520 48 Lithuania 17380
24 Cyprus 30180 49
Antigua and 
Barbuda 17050
25 Iceland 30000 50 Libya 16740
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own illustration. Source: World Bank 2011b  
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Table A 3: Rank of Top 50 countries according to their income Gini coefficient 2000-2010 
Rank 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2000-2010 Country Rank
Gini 
Coefficient 
2000-2010 Country 
1 16,80 Azerbaijan 26 32,10 Romania 
2 24,70 Denmark 27 32,10 Egypt 
3 24,90 Japan 28 32,60 Canada 
 4 25,00 Sweden 29 32,60 Lao People's Democ. Rep. 
5 25,80 Norway 30 32,70 France 
6 25,80 Czech Republic 31 33,00 Belgium 
7 25,80 Slovakia 32 33,00 Albania 
8 26,90 Finland 33 33,30 Burundi 
9 27,60 Ukraine 34 33,50 Kyrgyzstan 
10 28,20 Serbia 35 33,60 Tajikistan 
11 28,30 Germany 36 33,70 Switzerland 
12 28,80 Belarus 37 34,30 Ireland 
13 29,00 Croatia 38 34,30 Greece 
14 29,10 Austria 39 34,40 Togo 
15 29,20 Bulgaria 40 34,60 Tanzania (United Rep. of) 
16 29,80 Ethiopia 41 34,70 Spain 
17 30,00 Hungary 42 34,90 Poland 
18 30,20 Armenia 43 35,20 Australia 
19 30,90 Netherlands 44 35,30 Algeria 
20 30,90 Kazakhstan 45 35,50 Guinea-Bissau 
21 31,00 Bangladesh 46 35,80 Lithuania 
22 31,20 Slovenia 47 36,00 Italy 
23 31,20 Pakistan 48 36,00 United Kingdom 
24 31,60 Republic of Korea 49 36,00 Estonia 
25 31,90 Timor-Leste 50 36,20 New Zealand 
Own illustration. Source UN Statistics Division 2011 
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Rank  Countries 
Total Oil 
Production 
2009 Rank Countries 
Total Oil 
Production 
2009 
1 Russia 9933,71 26 Malaysia 693,00
2 Saudi Arabia 9759,69 27 Colombia 685,82
3 United States 9140,79 28 Egypt 678,30
4 Iran 4176,64 29 Australia 588,25
5 China 3995,62 30 Sudan 486,44
6 Canada 3294,42 31 Ecuador 485,29
7 Mexico 3001,47 32 Thailand 401,57
8 United Arab Emirates 2794,69 33 Syria 399,87
9 Brazil 2577,17 34 Equatorial Guinea 346,02
10 Kuwait 2496,43 35 Vietnam 345,59
11 Venezuela 2471,50 36 Yemen 286,50
12 Iraq 2400,34 37 Congo 274,34
13 Norway 2350,18 38 Denmark 262,14
14 Nigeria 2211,42 39 Gabon 241,81
15 Algeria 2085,59 40 Turkmenistan 198,15
16 Angola 1948,04 41 South Africa 192,14
17 Libya 1789,16 42 Brunei 154,62
18 Kazakhstan 1540,41 43 Trinidad and Tobago 149,77
19 
United Kingdom (+ 
Offshore) 1501,50 44 Italy 146,52
20 Qatar 1212,89 45 Peru 146,45
21 Indonesia 1045,85 46 Germany 133,04
22 Azerbaijan 1012,25 47 Japan 132,66
23 India 877,47 48 Chad 115,00
24 Oman 816,15 49 Romania 112,39
25 Argentina 794,47 50 Timor-Leste 96,27
Own illustration. Source: EIA 2011 
Table A 4: Rank of Top 50 Oil producing countries  
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Table A 5: Rank of Top 50 of Oil exporting countries 
Exports of Crude 
Oil including Lease 
Condensate 
(Thousand 
Barrels Per 
Day) 
Exports of Crude Oil 
including Lease 
Condensate  
(Thousand 
Barrels Per 
Day) 
Rank Countries 
Oil Exports 
2009 Rank Countries 
Oil Exports 
2009 
1 Saudi Arabia 6273,56 26 Congo (Brazzaville) 269,78
2 Russia 5430 27 Vietnam 267,46
3 Iran 2295,08 28 Australia 250,04
4 Nigeria 2051,18 29 Malaysia 236,42
5 
United Arab 
Emirates 2036,428 30 Gabon 226,84
6 Iraq 1877,97 31 Yemen 191,06
7 Norway 1758,88 32 Denmark 171,14
8 Angola 1757,112 33 Syria 144,029
9 Venezuela 1691,42 34 Brunei 141,28
10 Kuwait 1365,48 35 Chad 115
11 Canada 1355,36 36 China 101,46
12 Mexico 1299,28 37
Timor-Leste (East 
Timor) 96,266
13 Kazakhstan 1077,63 38 Argentina 93,6
14 Libya 1038,79 39 Egypt 86,72
15 Azerbaijan 844,883 40 Tunisia 65,96
16 United Kingdom 788,92 41 Cameroon 64,74
17 Qatar 704,327 42 Trinidad and Tobago 55,24
18 Oman 701,56 43
Cote dIvoire 
(IvoryCoast) 46,34
19 Algeria 697,475 44 New Zealand 45,18
20 Brazil 533,2 45 United States 43,795
21 Sudan 370,7 46 Turkmenistan 40,1644
22 Colombia 361,74 47 Thailand 39,82
23 Ecuador 341,94 48 Belarus 34,32
24 Equatorial Guinea 299,39 49 Philippines 28
25 Indonesia 293,132 50 Greece 19,96
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own illustration. Source: EIA 2011 
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Democracy 
Ranking 
2010
EIU 2010 
Overall 
Score
State 
Fragility 
Index 2010
Press 
Freedom 
Index 2009
Failed State 
Index 2010
CPI 2010 
Score
Rule of Law 
Index 2009 
Sum of all 
factors
WGI Rule 
of Law 
Indicator 
2009 
Score
WGI Rule 
of Law 
Indicator 
2009 
Percentile
Freedom 
House 
Index
GDP per 
capita 
2009 
GNI per 
capita 
PPP 2009 
EIU 2010 
Overall 
Score 0.895386
Observations 67
State 
Fragility 
Index 2010 -0.808204 -0.704280
Observations 67 67
Press 
Freedom 
Index 2009 -0.660552 -0.584652 0.614772
Observations 67 67 67
Failed State 
Index 2010 -0.914622 -0.880704 0.832750 0.736379
Observations 67 67 67 67
CPI 2010 
Score 0.878430 0.900749 -0.657700 -0.591701 -0.859978
Observations 67 67 67 67 67
Rule of Law 
Index 2009 
Sum of all 
factors 0.836200 0.872836 -0.598051 -0.706803 -0.849601 0.943368
Observations 25 25 25 25 25 25
WGI Rule of 
Law Indicator 
2009 Score 0.895005 0.899460 -0.717781 -0.591135 -0.886573 0.945423 0.931260
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25
Voter 
Turnout % 0.266523 0.370199 ‐0.193963 ‐0.106340 ‐0.294579 0.347062 0.439105 0.295695 0.287783 ‐0.1338180.267486 0.230173
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 25 66 66 66 66 66
WGI Rule of 
Law Indicator 
2009 
Percentile 0.868720 0.874915 -0.703110 -0.573199 -0.862057 0.915973 0.905898 0.991155
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67
Freedom 
House Index -0.826980 -0.703242 0.715240 0.807974 0.809530 -0.680775 -0.651223 -0.735557 -0.733179
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67 67
GDP per 
capita 2009 0.875694 0.860841 -0.607557 -0.541107 -0.829327 0.845894 0.893397 0.842953 0.803962 -0.624517
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67 67 67
GNI per 
capita PPP 
2009 0.906896 0.868112 -0.723339 -0.567931 -0.857156 0.844234 0.838792 0.873231 0.844910 -0.684048 0.963875
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67 67 67 67
Income Gini 
coefficient       
2000-2010 -0.525510 -0.446449 0.429234 0.314738 0.532110 -0.410454 -0.654171 -0.506454 -0.496252 0.433200 -0.536610 -0.556867
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 25 66 66 66 66 66
Mean years 
of Scooling 
2009 0.753260 0.625676 -0.719450 -0.431520 -0.647144 0.604396 0.651694 0.666451 0.658215 -0.580848 0.627325 0.722011
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67 67 67 67 67
Adult 
Literacy Rate 
(15+) 0.568532 0.412479 -0.663335 -0.158610 -0.443079 0.376978 0.340354 0.410143 0.408211 -0.320049 0.392004 0.493091
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67 67 67 67 67
VAP Turnout 
% 0.256492 0.311760 ‐0.174974 ‐0.121639 ‐0.236077 0.263913 0.264731 0.193580 0.191629 ‐0.1629940.259081 0.230048
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67 67 67 67 67
 
  
Table A 6: All correlations 
Own illustration and own calculations.
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Democracy 
Ranking 
2010
EIU 2010 
Overall 
Score
State 
Fragility 
Index 2010
Press 
Freedom 
Index 2009
Failed State 
Index 2010
CPI 2010 
Score
Rule of Law 
Index 2009 
Sum of all 
factors
WGI Rule 
of Law 
Indicator 
2009 
Score
WGI Rule 
of Law 
Indicator 
2009 
Percentile
Freedom 
House Index
GDP per 
capita 2009 
GNI per 
capita PPP 
2009 
Exports of 
crude Oil 0.172552 0.261663 -0.080531 0.052480 -0.146301 0.197837 -0.076184 0.156100 0.131966 -0.050682 0.313793 0.285920
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67 67 67 67 67
Total oil 
supply 0.132099 0.162578 -0.057516 -0.000854 -0.118719 0.141760 0.047521 0.144137 0.133583 -0.078430 0.244103 0.286170
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 25 67 67 67 67 67
IDV Values 0.729946 0.676338 -0.544568 -0.601523 -0.666320 0.670321 0.735852 0.746891 0.719547 -0.607239 0.704740 0.730749
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 22 51 51 51 51 51
PDI Values -0.722469 -0.728580 0.498027 0.634250 0.587767 -0.690379 -0.770519 -0.666081 -0.635959 0.554263 -0.650730 -0.641606
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 22 51 51 51 51 51
IVR Values 0.204072 0.328527 -0.008108 -0.013756 -0.199918 0.357426 0.087088 0.195761 0.151292 -0.045773 0.334846 0.287755
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 25 54 54 54 54 54
LTO Values 0.188500 0.117299 -0.356919 -0.166449 -0.194198 0.083983 0.390018 0.208622 0.228898 -0.193923 0.135915 0.203660
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 24 55 55 55 55 55
MAS Values -0.197774 -0.191832 0.083180 0.133244 0.131970 -0.198986 -0.131055 -0.146309 -0.141126 0.072488 -0.101158 -0.058309
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 23 51 51 51 51 51
UAI Values -0.256086 -0.441589 0.011487 0.253218 0.231996 -0.367899 -0.323420 -0.338350 -0.317547 0.106528 -0.343420 -0.273927
Observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 22 49 49 49 49 49
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 6 (part 2): All correlations. Own illustration. 
Own illustration and own calculations.
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Country EIU 2010
Democracy 
Ranking  
2010 
Freedom 
House 
2010
PFI 
2009
CPI 
2010
Gini 
Coefficient 
2000-2010
GNI pC 
PPP 
2009
GDP pC 
2009 
Adult 
(15+) 
literacy 
rate (%)
SFI 
2009
FSI 
2010
Total Oil 
Supply 
2009
Argentina 6,84 62,54 2,00 11,33 2,90 48,80 14230 7665 97,73 1 45,80 794,47
Australia 9,22 78,91 1,00 3,13 8,70 35,20 38380 42131 99,00 2 27,30 588,25
Austria 8,49 79,30 1,00 3,00 7,90 29,10 38620 45555 99,00 0 27,20 25,41
Belgium 8,05 78,73 1,00 2,50 7,10 33,00 36190 43640 99,00 2 32,00 11,22
Benin 6,17 44,39 2,00 16,00 2,80 38,60 1570 772 41,65 13 76,80 0,00
Botswana 7,63 53,00 2,50 15,50 5,80 61,00 13060 5790 84,12 4 68,60 0,00
Brazil 7,12 59,67 2,00 15,88 3,70 55,00 10230 8251 90,04 6 67,40 2577,17
Bulgaria 6,84 62,36 2,00 15,61 3,60 29,20 13290 6403 98,32 3 61,20 2,92
Canada 9,08 78,73 1,00 3,70 8,90 32,60 37260 39599 99,00 0 27,90 3294,42
Chile 7,67 69,66 1,00 10,50 7,20 52,00 13270 9487 98,55 2 38,00 10,77
Colombia 6,55 54,02 3,50 40,13 3,50 58,50 8760 5166 93,24 12 88,20 685,82
Costa Rica 8,04 69,59 1,00 8,00 5,30 48,90 10830 6369 96,06 0 52,00 -0,26
Croatia 6,81 66,52 1,50 17,17 4,10 29,00 19260 14323 98,76 3 59,00 24,22
Czech Republic 8,19 70,67 1,00 5,00 4,60 25,80 24060 18137 99,00 1 41,50 10,72
Denmark 9,52 84,25 1,00 0,00 9,30 24,70 38360 55933 99,00 0 22,90 262,14
Dom. Republic 6,20 57,78 2,00 26,83 3,00 48,40 8390 4756 88,24 6 76,80 -0,39
El Salvador 6,47 57,98 2,50 17,25 3,60 46,90 6380 3425 84,10 5 78,10 -0,44
Estonia 7,68 72,18 1,00 0,50 6,50 36,00 19420 14239 99,79 1 50,70 7,60
Finland 9,19 86,45 1,00 0,00 9,20 26,90 36270 44577 99,00 0 19,30 8,72
France 7,77 76,89 1,00 10,67 6,80 32,70 33870 40663 99,00 1 34,90 78,91
Germany 8,38 80,61 1,00 3,50 7,90 28,30 36740 40659 99,00 0 35,40 133,04
Ghana 6,02 51,42 1,50 6,00 4,10 42,80 1530 1098 66,62 14 67,10 7,69
Greece 7,92 69,10 1,50 9,00 3,50 34,30 28180 28936 97,16 1 45,90 6,78
Guatemala 6,05 46,80 4,00 29,50 3,20 53,70 4600 2685 74,47 11 81,20 13,53
Hungary 7,21 69,05 1,00 5,50 4,70 30,00 19060 12847 99,37 0 50,10 35,58
India 7,28 49,09 2,50 29,33 3,30 36,80 3290 1195 62,75 13 79,20 877,47
Indonesia 6,53 49,82 2,50 28,50 2,80 37,60 3940 2272 92,19 10 83,10 1045,85
Ireland 8,79 82,41 1,00 0,00 8,00 34,30 33170 49738 99,00 0 22,40 -0,43
Israel 7,48 72,13 1,50 23,75 6,10 39,20 26850 26102 97,10 9 84,60 4,03
Italy 7,83 70,63 1,50 12,14 3,90 36,00 31930 35073 98,87 0 45,70 146,52
Jamaica 7,21 57,67 2,50 4,75 3,30 45,50 7280 4693 86,36 4 67,40 -0,51
Japan 8,08 73,61 1,50 3,25 7,80 24,90 32880 39456 99,00 0 31,30 132,66
Korea, Rep. 8,11 67,94 1,50 15,67 5,40 31,60 27250 17110 99,00 0 41,30 46,09
Latvia 7,05 70,00 1,50 3,00 4,30 36,30 17400 11476 99,78 0 55,40 0,00
Lithuania 7,24 70,91 1,00 2,25 5,00 35,80 17380 11034 99,70 1 47,80 5,73
Macedonia 6,16 51,20 3,00 8,75 4,10 42,80 11040 4510 97,00 5 72,70 -0,12
Malaysia 6,19 47,11 4,00 44,25 4,40 37,90 13550 6909 92,46 5 69,20 693,00
Mali 6,01 42,87 2,50 8,00 2,70 39,00 1000 601 26,18 14 79,30 0,00
Mauritius 8,04 65,00 2,00 14,00 5,40 N.A. 13120 6951 87,90 1 44,40 0,00
Mexico 6,93 55,27 2,50 48,25 3,10 51,60 13570 7880 93,44 4 76,10 3001,47
Moldova 6,33 51,68 3,50 33,75 2,90 37,40 3040 1526 98,00 10 83,80 0,00
Mongolia 6,36 56,62 2,00 23,33 2,70 36,60 3660 1690 97,49 8 60,10 0,00
Namibia 6,23 54,26 2,00 9,00 4,40 74,30 6190 4096 88,51 6 74,50 0,00
Netherlands 8,99 82,77 1,00 1,00 8,80 30,90 39720 48068 99,00 0 27,90 69,05
New Zealand 9,26 82,82 1,00 3,00 9,30 36,20 28050 29352 99,00 0 23,90 61,15
Norway 9,80 89,42 1,00 0,00 8,60 25,80 54220 78409 99,00 2 18,70 2350,18
Panama 7,15 64,03 1,50 14,50 3,60 54,90 12210 6956 93,61 5 59,30 0,00
Paraguay 6,40 52,07 3,00 14,33 2,20 53,20 4460 2245 94,56 8 72,10 0,00
Peru 6,40 60,66 2,50 20,88 3,50 50,50 8270 4412 89,59 8 76,90 146,45
Philippines 6,12 53,97 3,50 38,25 2,40 44,00 3720 1836 95,42 12 87,10 24,57
Poland 7,05 69,23 1,00 9,50 5,30 34,90 18260 11288 99,51 0 49,00 33,57
Portugal 8,02 75,40 1,00 8,00 6,00 38,50 24040 22030 94,91 0 33,10 4,72
Romania 6,60 61,85 2,00 12,50 3,70 32,10 14480 7500 97,65 5 60,20 112,39
Serbia 6,33 57,67 2,00 15,50 3,50 28,20 10860 5690 97,77 6 77,80 12,31
Slovak Republic 7,35 67,53 1,00 11,00 4,30 25,80 22450 16174 99,00 1 48,80 7,87
Slovenia 7,69 74,46 1,00 9,50 6,40 31,20 26940 24101 99,68 0 36,00 0,01
South Africa 7,79 54,70 2,00 8,50 4,50 57,80 10100 5733 89,00 9 67,90 192,14
Spain 8,16 77,99 1,00 11,00 6,10 34,70 31520 31891 97,68 1 43,50 27,23
Sri Lanka   6,64 49,69 4,00 75,00 3,20 41,10 4650 2035 90,56 12 95,70 -0,64
Sweden 9,50 88,18 1,00 0,00 9,20 25,00 37860  99,00 0 20,90 4,83
Switzerland 9,09 86,05 1,00 1,00 8,70 33,70 46800 63525 99,00 1 21,80 3,49
Thailand 6,55 47,55 4,50 44,00 3,50 42,50 7610 3838 93,51 7 78,80 401,57
Trinidad &Tobago 7,16 58,27 2,00 7,00 3,60 40,30 24300 14684 98,74 4 66,10 149,77
Ukraine 6,30 53,62 2,50 22,00 2,40 27,60 6240 2545 99,69 6 69,50 92,04
United Kingdom 8,16 80,61 1,00 4,00 7,60 36,00 35640 35163 99,00 0 33,90 1501,50
United States 8,18 78,30 1,00 4,00 7,10 40,80 45400 45745 99,00 2 35,30 9140,79
Uruguay 8,10 72,25 1,00 7,63 6,90 47,10 12920 9364 98,27 1 41,30 0,90
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 7:  Data for all analyzed 67 democracies 
Own illustration. Sources: See References
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Country
Exports 
of 
Crude 
Oil 2009
WGI Rule 
of Law 
2009  
Score
WGI Rule 
of Law 
2009 
Percentile 
Rule of Law 
Index 2009 
Sum of all 
factors 
Voter 
Turnout 
(%)
VAP 
Turnout 
(%)
PDI 
Values
IDV 
Values
MAS  
Values
UAI  
Values
LTO  
Values
IVR  
Values
Argentina 93,60 -0,67 30,80 7,63 72,39 70,89 49,00 46,00 56,00 86,00 20,00 62,00
Australia 250,04 1,74 95,30 11,10 95,17 82,74 38,00 90,00 61,00 51,00 21,00 71,00
Austria 0,00 1,78 96,20 11,92 81,71 75,61 11,00 55,00 79,00 70,00 60,00 63,00
Belgium 0,00 1,38 88,60 N.A. 91,08 86,00 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 82,00 57,00
Benin 0,00 -0,70 29,40 N.A. 58,69 61,83 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Botswana 0,00 0,66 67,80 N.A. 76,71 62,20 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Brazil 533,20 -0,21 50,20 N.A. 83,27 83,54 69,00 38,00 49,00 76,00 44,00 59,00
Bulgaria 0,00 -0,05 54,00 8,59 60,64 72,43 70,00 30,00 40,00 85,00 69,00 16,00
Canada 1355,36 1,79 96,70 11,35 59,52 53,59 39,00 80,00 52,00 48,00 36,00 68,00
Chile 0,00 1,24 87,20 N.A. 87,67 59,63 63,00 23,00 28,00 86,00 31,00 N.A.
Colombia 361,74 -0,41 42,70 8,08 40,49 39,42 67,00 13,00 64,00 80,00 13,00 83,00
Costa Rica 0,00 0,54 65,40 N.A. 65,13 54,01 35,00 15,00 21,00 86,00 N.A. N.A.
Croatia 0,00 0,15 58,80 7,40 59,58 70,84 73,00 33,00 40,00 80,00 58,00 33,00
Czech Republic 0,42 0,96 80,10 N.A. 64,47 65,12 57,00 58,00 57,00 74,00 70,00 29,00
Denmark 171,14 1,90 98,60 N.A. 86,59 83,20 18,00 74,00 16,00 23,00 35,00 70,00
Dom. Republic 0,00 -0,77 25,10 8,64 56,46 56,40 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 13,00 54,00
El Salvador 0,00 -0,80 22,30 8,21 53,58 61,65 66,00 19,00 40,00 94,00 20,00 89,00
Estonia 0,00 1,11 84,40 N.A. 61,91 53,44 40,00 60,00 30,00 60,00 82,00 16,00
Finland 0,00 1,96 100,00 N.A. 65,02 68,18 33,00 63,00 26,00 59,00 38,00 57,00
France 0,00 1,45 90,00 11,02 59,98 43,43 68,00 71,00 43,00 86,00 63,00 48,00
Germany 2,20 1,65 92,90 N.A. 70,78 64,61 35,00 67,00 66,00 65,00 83,00 40,00
Ghana 0,00 -0,08 52,60 8,72 69,52 66,59 N.A. N.A. 57,00 N.A. 4,00 72,00
Greece 19,96 0,63 67,30 N.A. 70,92 79,24 60,00 33,00 N.A. 112,00 45,00 50,00
Guatemala 12,62 -1,10 14,20 N.A. 60,46 57,19 95,00 6,00 37,00 101,00 N.A. N.A.
Hungary 0,00 0,78 72,50 N.A. 64,39 41,08 46,00 80,00 88,00 82,00 58,00 31,00
India 0,00 0,01 55,00 9,11 58,19 56,48 77,00 48,00 56,00 40,00 51,00 26,00
Indonesia 293,13 -0,60 34,10 8,10 70,99 74,04 78,00 14,00 46,00 48,00 62,00 38,00
Ireland 0,00 1,73 94,80 N.A. 67,03 68,89 28,00 70,00 68,00 35,00 24,00 65,00
Israel 0,00 0,81 73,90 N.A. 64,72 70,24 13,00 54,00 47,00 81,00 38,00 N.A.
Italy 7,50 0,35 62,10 N.A. 80,54 79,13 50,00 76,00 70,00 75,00 61,00 30,00
Jamaica 0,00 -0,48 39,30 N.A. 60,40 49,56 45,00 39,00 68,00 13,00 N.A. N.A.
Japan 0,00 1,29 88,20 11,44 69,27 69,34 54,00 46,00 95,00 92,00 88,00 42,00
Korea, Rep. 0,00 0,98 81,00 9,63 46,01 46,59 60,00 18,00 39,00 85,00 100,00 29,00
Latvia 0,00 0,81 73,50 N.A. 60,98 50,18 44,00 70,00 9,00 63,00 69,00 13,00
Lithuania 2,26 0,71 70,60 N.A. 32,37 29,44 42,00 60,00 19,00 65,00 82,00 16,00
Macedonia 0,00 -0,27 46,40 N.A. 57,99 67,08 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 62,00 35,00
Malaysia 236,42 0,47 63,50 N.A. 75,99 53,40 104,00 26,00 50,00 N.A. 41,00 57,00
Mali 0,00 -0,37 43,10 N.A. 32,19 38,96 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 20,00 43,00
Mauritius 0,00 0,93 79,60 N.A. 81,25 75,34 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Mexico 1299,28 -0,59 34,60 7,29 44,61 47,77 81,00 30,00 69,00 82,00 N.A. 97,00
Moldova 0,00 -0,47 39,80 N.A. 58,77 46,36 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 71,00 19,00
Mongolia 5,26 -0,31 46,00 N.A. 74,31 60,47 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Namibia 0,00 0,25 61,10 N.A. N.A. 67,53 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Netherlands 13,14 1,80 97,20 11,95 80,35 77,48 38,00 80,00 14,00 53,00 67,00 68,00
New Zealand 45,18 1,92 99,10 N.A. 79,46 77,84 22,00 79,00 58,00 49,00 33,00 75,00
Norway 1758,88 1,90 98,10 N.A. 76,37 74,74 31,00 69,00 8,00 50,00 35,00 55,00
Panama 0,00 -0,16 51,70 N.A. 70,05 70,53 95,00 11,00 44,00 86,00 N.A. N.A.
Paraguay 0,00 -0,97 17,50 N.A. 65,48 49,86 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Peru 18,88 -0,67 30,30 8,43 88,66 84,09 64,00 16,00 42,00 87,00 25,00 46,00
Philippines 28,00 -0,56 36,00 7,84 63,68 54,87 94,00 32,00 64,00 44,00 27,00 42,00
Poland 4,52 0,62 66,80 9,67 53,88 54,24 68,00 60,00 64,00 93,00 38,00 29,00
Portugal 0,00 1,04 82,90 N.A. 59,68 66,14 63,00 27,00 31,00 104,00 28,00 33,00
Romania 0,00 0,05 55,50 N.A. 39,20 40,48 90,00 30,00 42,00 90,00 52,00 20,00
Serbia 0,00 -0,43 42,20 N.A. 61,35 70,17 86,00 25,00 43,00 92,00 52,00 28,00
Slovak Republic 0,30 0,55 65,90 N.A. 54,67 56,40 104,00 52,00 110,00 51,00 77,00 28,00
Slovenia 0,00 1,09 83,90 N.A. 63,10 65,04 71,00 27,00 19,00 88,00 49,00 48,00
South Africa 0,00 0,08 57,30 8,89 77,30 56,57 N.A. N.A. N.A. 49,00 34,00 63,00
Spain 0,00 1,15 85,30 10,58 76,03 77,92 57,00 51,00 42,00 N.A. 48,00 44,00
Sri Lanka   0,00 -0,08 53,10 N.A. 75,96 70,78 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Sweden 0,00 1,95 99,50 12,46 81,99 80,60 31,00 71,00 5,00 29,00 53,00 78,00
Switzerland 0,00 1,76 95,70 N.A. 48,28 39,79 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 74,00 66,00
Thailand 39,82 -0,23 47,40 9,03 78,51 76,23 64,00 20,00 34,00 64,00 32,00 45,00
Trinidad &Tobago 55,24 -0,23 48,30 N.A. 66,03 72,52 47,00 16,00 58,00 55,00 13,00 80,00
Ukraine 0,16 -0,80 22,70 N.A. 62,03 62,73 N.A. N.A. N.A. 86,00 14,00
United Kingdom 788,92 1,73 94,30 N.A. 61,36 58,32 35,00 89,00 66,00 35,00 51,00 69,00
United States 43,80 1,54 91,50 10,28 64,36 57,45 40,00 91,00 62,00 46,00 26,00 68,00
Uruguay 0,00 0,71 70,10 N.A. 89,91 96,88 61,00 36,00 38,00 N.A. 26,00 53,00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 7 part 2:  Data for all analyzed 67 democracies. Own illustration 
Own illustration. Sources: See References
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Abstract (English) 
In the last decades there was a trend of democratization with an increase in the number of 
countries having this type of political system. However, for some reasons some 
democracies apparently function better than others and have a higher quality of democracy. 
This analysis takes a closer look on the factors that might influence the quality of 
democracy by taking a dual approach: A statistical analysis for 67 as democracy 
categorized countries and a comparison of the similarities of high quality democracies. For 
both, categorization and the quality of democracy, two democracy indexes are used (EIU 
Democracy index 2010 and  Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy 2010). An 
analysis for possible influencing factors for the year 2009, by using different indicators, 
shows certain similarities among high quality democracies and some of the computed 
correlations are strong. The results indicate that press freedom, corruption, the rule of law, 
political rights and civil liberties and education (as indicated by the mean years of 
schooling) do have an influence on the quality of democracy. The parliamentary system 
also seems to have a positive influence on the quality of democracy – almost all high 
quality democracies have this system of government. On contrary voter turnout does not 
seem to have a significant influence on the quality of democracy. Other factors that do not 
seem to have an influence on the quality of democracy are income distribution and literacy 
rate. The causalities of the relationships some factors have with the quality remain unclear 
– even if there factors (indicators) among the, having high correlations with the democracy 
indexes, e.g. GNI per capita PPP.  
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Abstract (Deutsch) 
In den letzten Jahrzehnten gab es einen Trend in Demokratisierung und die Zahl der 
Länder mit Demokratie als politisches System ist angestiegen. Dennoch scheint es, dass 
aus gewissen Gründen einige Demokratien besser funktionieren als andere bzw. eine 
höhere Demokratiequalität haben.  Die durchgeführte Analyse untersucht mögliche 
Einflussfaktoren der Demokratiequalität: Dabei werden zum einen 67 als Demokratie 
kategorisierte Länder statistisch analysiert und zum anderen werden Länder mit einer 
hohen Demokratiequalität auf ihre Gemeinsamkeiten verglichen. Sowohl die 
Kategorisierung von Demokratien als auch die Bestimmung derer Qualität geschieht an 
Hand von zwei Demokratieindizes (EIU Democracy index 2010 und Democracy Ranking 
of the Quality of Democracy 2010). Die Analyse für das Jahr 2009 bezüglich den Faktoren 
welche die Demokratiequalität beeinflussen könnten, zeigt gewisse Ähnlichkeiten unter 
den Demokratien mit hoher Qualität und einige Faktoren (Indikatoren) zeigen weisen 
starke Korrelationen mit den Demokratieindizes auf. Die Ergebnisse deuten auf einen 
Einfluss von den Faktoren Pressefreiheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, politischen Rechten und 
zivilen Freiheiten und von Bildung (gemessen an durchschnittlich absolvierten 
Schuljahren)  hin. Das parlamentarische System scheint ebenfalls einen positiven Einfluss 
auf die Qualität der Demokratie zu haben – fast alle Demokratien mit hoher Qualität haben 
dieses Regierungssystem. Im Gegensatz scheint die Wahlbeteiligung keinen signifikanten 
Einfluss auf die Demokratiequalität zu haben. So auch nicht andere Faktoren wie 
Einkommensverteilung und Alphabetisierungsrate für welche kein signifikanter 
Zusammenhang gefunden werden konnte. Die Kausalität von einigen Faktoren bleibt, auch 
wenn sie starke Korrelationen mit den Demokratieindizes haben, ungeklärt wie z.B. BNE 
pro Kopf in KKP.  
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